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I.	  Introduction	  	   For	  the	  first	  time	  in	  history,	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  (RPP)	  is	  leading	  the	  polls	  for	  a	  European	  parliamentary	  election.	  According	  to	  the	  latest	  polls,	  the	  French	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  Front	  National	  (FN)	  is	  projected	  to	  receive	  a	  plurality	  of	  the	  vote,	  with	  23%	  of	  respondents	  saying	  that	  they	  will	  vote	  for	  FN	  in	  the	  European	  elections	  
ǡ͵ͶΨǯ1.	  Moreover,	  Front	  National	  just	  secured	  its	  best	  ever	  result	  in	  local	  elections,	  winning	  fourteen	  townships2.	  Even	  if	  Front	  National	  does	  not	  receive	  the	  most	  votes	  this	  spring,	  its	  ascension	  into	  the	  mainstream	  of	  European	  politics	  is	  already	  a	  symbolic	  victory	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  Right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  were	  a	  fringe	  movement	  in	  Europe	  just	  twenty	  years	  ago,	  but	  today	  they	  have	  firmly	  established	  themselves	  in	  over	  half	  a	  dozen	  countries.	  The	  world	  is	  beginning	  to	  take	  notice	  of	  a	  development	  that	  political	  scientists	  have	  been	  studying	  for	  decades:	  A	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  European	  electorate	  has	  become	  more	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  right	  wing	  cause.	  	  	   Over	  the	  last	  thirty	  years,	  European	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  made	  considerable	  electoral	  gains	  at	  the	  national,	  state,	  and	  local	  levels	  of	  government.	  The	  
ǯ	  (SVP)	  is	  currently	  the	  most	  popular	  party	  in	  Switzerland,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  ǲEuropéennes	  :	  le	  Front	  national	  en	  tête	  des	  intentions	  de	  voteǳle	  Parisien.	  26	  January	  2014	  2	  ǡǲ	ǯ	ǳThe	  Telegraph	  30	  March	  2014	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controlling	  26.6%	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  the	  National	  Council3.	  Right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  also	  currently	  have	  large	  parliamentary	  vote	  shares	  in	  Norway	  (16.3%)4,	  Belgium	  (7.8%)5,	  Denmark	  (13.5%)6,	  and	  Austria	  (20.5%)7.	  While	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  if	  the	  right	  wing	  populist	  movement	  will	  extend	  its	  influence	  into	  other	  European	  legislatures,	  its	  success	  has	  been	  too	  extensive	  and	  sustained	  to	  be	  written	  off	  as	  an	  anomaly.	  Clearly,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  dramatic	  shift	  in	  voting	  behavior,	  at	  the	  very	  least	  in	  these	  specific	  countries	  if	  not	  Western	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  	   This	  leads	  me	  to	  my	  primary	  research	  question:	  Why	  have	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  been	  so	  much	  more	  successful	  in	  national	  elections	  over	  the	  last	  twenty-­‐five	  years?	  How	  exactly	  has	  the	  electorate	  changed	  that	  they	  now	  find	  right	  wing	  populism	  so	  much	  more	  appealing?	  Moreover,	  is	  it	  simply	  the	  electorate	  that	  has	  changed,	  or	  have	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  also	  significantly	  altered	  their	  platform	  in	  order	  to	  broaden	  their	  appeal?	  Using	  the	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  in	  Austria,	  Denmark,	  and	  France	  as	  case	  studies,	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  identify	  the	  principal	  causes	  of	  this	  shift	  in	  voting	  behavior.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Dataset:	  Swiss	  Federal	  Election,	  2011.	  European	  Election	  Database.	  Web	  6	  Nov.	  2013	  4	  Dataset:	  Norwegian	  Parliamentary	  Election,	  2013.	  European	  Election	  Database.	  Web	  6	  Nov.	  2013	  5	  Dataset:	  Belgian	  Federal	  Election,	  2011.	  European	  Election	  Database.	  Web	  6	  Nov.	  2013	  6	  Dataset:	  Danish	  General	  Election,	  2011.	  European	  Election	  Database.	  Web	  6	  Nov.	  2013	  7	  Dataset:	  Austrian	  Legislative	  Election,	  2013.	  European	  Election	  Database.	  Web	  6	  Nov.	  2013	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   This	  shift	  in	  individual	  voting	  behavior	  is	  certainly	  a	  major	  component	  of	  right	  
ǯ	  success,	  but	  a	  ǯ	  electoral	  system	  is	  perhaps	  just	  as	  vital	  to	  the	  viability	  of	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party.	  Currently,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  only	  become	  major	  parties	  in	  countries	  that	  award	  seats	  in	  parliament	  based	  on	  proportional	  representation.	  I	  will	  try	  to	  discern	  if	  this	  disparity	  in	  representation	  is	  due	  to	  some	  inherent	  component	  of	  the	  proportional	  system	  that	  is	  beneficial	  to	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  Relating	  to	  that	  question,	  I	  will	  also	  look	  at	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  in	  countries	  that	  do	  not	  have	  a	  proportional	  system,	  and	  I	  will	  try	  to	  determine	  if	  these	  electoral	  systems	  are	  currently	  preventing	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  from	  becoming	  viable	  on	  the	  national	  level.	  	  	   The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  investigate	  why	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  came	  into	  power,	  but	  I	  will	  also	  briefly	  examine	  how	  these	  parties	  have	  been	  able	  to	  influence	  national	  policy.	  For	  my	  secondary	  research	  question	  I	  will	  try	  to	  determine	  just	  how	  successful	  each	  major	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  has	  been	  in	  implementing	  its	  agenda.	  I	  will	  look	  at	  what	  laws,	  particularly	  those	  relating	  to	  immigration,	  prominent	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  been	  able	  to	  pass.	  Beyond	  their	  direct	  legislative	  accomplishments,	  I	  will	  also	  touch	  upon	  the	  impact	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  had	  on	  the	  European	  political	  discourse;	  specifically,	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  have	  forced	  mainstream	  parties	  to	  shift	  to	  the	  right	  on	  any	  major	  issue.	  	  	   	  	  
	  	   7	  
II.	  Layout	  	   Beginning	  in	  Section	  III	  I	  will	  give	  a	  brief	  historical	  overview	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  across	  Europe	  from	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II	  to	  the	  present	  day.	  Next	  I	  will	  review	  the	  relevant	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  contemporary	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  in	  section	  IV,	  in	  which	  I	  will	  identify	  the	  most	  prominent	  theories	  as	  to	  why	  they	  have	  risen	  to	  greater	  prominence	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years;	  I	  will	  then	  form	  my	  hypotheses	  based	  on	  these	  theories.	  	  	   I	  will	  devote	  one	  section	  each	  to	  my	  case	  studies	  of	  Austria,	  Denmark,	  and	  France,	  where	  I	  will	  examine	  each	  ǯ	  demographics,	  electoral	  history,	  economic	  variables,	  and	  relevant	  cultural	  factors.	  I	  will	  then	  conclude	  this	  thesis	  with	  two	  levels	  of	  comparative	  analysis;	  first	  by	  determining	  the	  most	  significant	  motives	  of	  right	  wing	  voters,	  and	  then	  by	  examining	  what	  effects,	  if	  any,	  ǯthe	  success	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  Based	  on	  the	  data	  gathered	  by	  these	  two	  experiments,	  I	  will	  determine	  if	  a	  given	  hypothesis	  was	  strongly	  supported,	  seriously	  discredited,	  or	  if	  the	  data	  was	  inconclusive	  and	  requires	  further	  research.	  Additionally,	  I	  will	  rank	  the	  relative	  importance	  of	  each	  factor	  (economic,	  cultural,	  and	  structural)	  in	  facilitating	  the	  rise	  of	  right	  wing	  populism	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  	  	  	   III.	  Historical	  Overview	  	   In	  the	  years	  immediately	  following	  the	  Second	  World	  War,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  virtually	  ceased	  to	  exist	  across	  Europe,	  as	  their	  brand	  had	  become	  toxic.	  Rightly	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or	  wrongly,	  the	  majority	  of	  voters	  associated	  right	  wing	  parties	  with	  fascism	  and	  the	  Third	  Reich8.	  This	  label	  proved	  exceedingly	  difficult	  to	  discredit,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  had	  little	  to	  no	  relevance	  in	  the	  European	  political	  landscape.	  From	  the	  1950s	  to	  the	  1980s,	  only	  a	  select	  few	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  broke	  the	  vote	  threshold	  needed	  to	  attain	  seats	  in	  parliament,	  and	  never	  was	  this	  success	  sustained	  for	  multiple	  terms9.The	  first	  signs	  of	  life	  for	  the	  movement	  came	  in	  France,	  when	  Front	  National	  received	  nearly	  10%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  1986	  national	  election10.	  	  It	  was	  not	  long	  after	  that	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  started	  to	  gain	  seats	  in	  the	  national	  parliaments	  of	  Austria,	  Switzerland,	  Denmark,	  and	  Norway.	  	  	   	  Since	  the	  early	  nineties,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  become	  more	  popular	  in	  almost	  every	  country	  in	  Europe,	  but	  as	  of	  2014	  they	  only	  have	  widespread	  followings	  in	  Austria,	  Denmark,	  Switzerland,	  Norway,	  Belgium,	  and	  France.	  Though	  the	  number	  of	  seats	  won	  has	  varied	  between	  elections,	  support	  for	  RPPs	  in	  these	  countries	  has	  remained	  relatively	  stable,	  with	  each	  party	  sans	  Front	  National	  consistently	  maintaining	  enough	  seats	  to	  qualify	  for	  the	  vote	  threshold	  in	  the	  national	  parliament.	  	   	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Rydgren,	  Jens.	  2005.	  "Is	  extreme	  right-­‐wing	  populism	  contagious?	  Explaining	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  new	  party	  family".	  European	  Journal	  of	  Political	  Research.	  44	  (3):	  413-­‐437.	  	  9	  Halla,	  Martin	  and	  Wagner,	  Alexander	  F.	  and	  Zweimüller,	  Josef,	  Immigration	  and	  Voting	  for	  the	  Extreme	  Right	  (October	  25,	  2013).	  	  10	  Dataset:	  European	  Election	  Database-­‐France,	  1986.	  European	  Election	  Database.	  Web	  6	  Nov.	  2013	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   Figure	  1.1.	  Taken	  from	  Langenbacher,  Nora.  2011.  Is  Europe  on  the  "right"  path?  right-­wing  extremism  
   and  right-­wing  populism  in  Europe.  Berlin:  Friedrich-­Ebert-­Stiftung,  Forum  Berlin.  p.  44  	  As	  the	  chart	  above	  demonstrates,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  all	  across	  Europe	  have	  steadily	  increased	  their	  vote	  shares	  over	  the	  last	  thirty	  years.	  The	  average	  national	  vote	  share	  of	  RPPs	  has	  risen	  by	  nearly	  ten	  points.	  Moreover,	  even	  though	  right	  wing	  populism	  remains	  largely	  irrelevant	  in	  many	  countries,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  every	  RPP	  currently	  enjoys	  a	  higher	  vote	  share	  than	  it	  did	  in	  1980-­‐84.	  	  In	  a	  relatively	  short	  amount	  of	  time,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  gone	  from	  essentially	  non-­‐existent	  in	  Europe	  to	  having	  double	  digit	  vote	  shares	  in	  five	  countries,	  even	  managing	  to	  attain	  a	  plurality	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  Switzerland	  and	  Austria	  (though	  the	  FPÖ	  is	  currently	  the	  ǯthird	  
	  	   10	  
largest	  party).	  	  The	  chart	  below	  demonstrates	  how	  RPPS	  have	  followed	  a	  similar	  trend	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  	  	  	  Percent	  Representation	  in	  European	  Parliament	  Year	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  FPÖ	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  UKIP	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  DF	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  VB	  1994	   	   	   27.5	   	   	   1	   	   X	   	   7.8	  1999	   	   	   23.4	   	   	   6.7	   	   5.8	   	   9.4	  2004	   	   	   6.3	   	   	   16.1	   	   6.8	   	   14.3	   	  2009	   	   	   17.8	   	   	   16.6	   	   14.8	   	   10.1	  Figure	  1.2.	  Created	  by	  author	  with	  data	  gathered	  from	  the	  European	  Election	  Database	  Moreover,	  	ȋʹ͵ΨȌǡǯȋͳͷΨȌǡFreedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (30%)	  all	  leading	  in	  the	  polls	  for	  the	  upcoming	  European	  Parliamentary	  elections,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  support	  for	  right	  wing	  populism	  now	  seems	  to	  be	  as	  strong	  as	  it	  has	  ever	  been.	  	  
IV.	  Literature	  Review	   	  	   In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  discuss	  the	  different	  approaches	  to	  defining	  right	  wing	  populism,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  most	  prominent	  theories	  as	  to	  why	  far	  right	  parties	  succeed	  in	  certain	  countries	  but	  not	  others.	  	  	  
Definition/Terminology	  	   To	  form	  an	  accurate	  definition	  of	  right	  wing	  populism,	  one	  must	  understand	  its	  
ǡǲǳǲǳ.	  ǲǳthat	  accepts	  or	  supports	  a	  system	  of	  social	  hierarchy	  or	  social	  inequality11.	  Right	  wing	  
ǯ
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Rodney	  P.	  Carlisle.	  Encyclopedia	  of	  politics:	  the	  left	  and	  the	  right,	  Volume	  2.	  University	  of	  Michigan;	  Sage	  Reference,	  2005.	  p.693,	  721.	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condemnation	  of	  immigrants	  and	  their	  claims	  that	  the	  state	  should	  not	  support	  them	  
ǲnativeǳ	  citizens.	  	  Hans	  Georg	  Betz,	  describes	  these	  parties	  as	  right	  wing	  because	  they	  ǲintegration	  of	  foreigners	  and	  other	  outǳ12.	  	  Right	  wing	  populist	  parties,	  whether	  for	  cultural	  or	  economic	  reasons,	  all	  want	  to	  drastically	  limit	  immigration	  into	  their	  respective	  countries,	  if	  not	  entirely.	  Moreover,	  consistent	  with	  their	  belief	  in	  a	  social	  hierarchy,	  Betz	  also	  classifies	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  as	  having	  a	  neo-­‐liberal	  economic	  philosophy.	  According	  to	  Betz,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  ǲǡ
ǡǳ	  and	  advocate	  to	  remedy	  this	  with	  a	  ǲ	  curtailing	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  economy	  and	  large-­‐scale	  privatization	  of	  the	  public	  ǳ13.	   
 ǲǳof	  these	  ǯideology,	  the	  term	  ǲǳ	  would	  best	  describe	  how	  they	  promote	  their	  ideas	  to	  the	  general	  public.	  According	  to	  Betz,	  a	  populist	  rhetoric	  ǲ	  allegedly	  superior	  common	  sense	  of	  the	  common	  people	  against	  the	  dominant	  cultural	  
ǳ14.	  A	  populist	  party	  has	  a	  deliberately	  divisive	  and	  antagonistic	  message,	  often	  claiming	  to	  be	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  working	  class	  while	  demonizing	  the	  so-­‐
ǲǳǤǡ
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Betz,	  p.	  413	  13	  Betz,	  p.	  418	  14	  ǡ
ǲ	-­‐Wing	  Populism	  in	  WǳǤ
The	  Review	  of	  Politics,	  Vol.	  55,	  No.	  4	  (Autumn,	  1993),	  pp.	  663-­‐685	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parties	  are	  exploiting	  the	  frustration	  of	  the	  general	  public	  for	  political	  gain15.	  These	  parties	  employ	  a	  populist	  approach	  in	  that	  they	  specifically	  cater	  to	  voters	  who	  have	  become	  ǲdisenchanted	  with	  their	  individual	  life	  chances	  and	  the	  political	  systemǳ16	  and	  are	  able	  effectively	  channel	  this	  anger	  into	  electoral	  support	  by	  creating	  scapegoats	  out	  of	  immigrants	  and	  the	  mainstream	  ǲǳ	  who	  control	  the	  parties	  in	  power.    
   Neither	  of	  the	  two	  terms	  ǲǳǲǳ	  by	  themselves	  adequately	  describes	  the	  parties	  in	  this	  family,	  and	  Betz	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	  the	  only	  by	  combining	  	  these	  two	  terms	  that	  one	  gets	  an	  accurate	  definition	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  Betz	  ultimately	  characterizes	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  as	  follows:	  	  
they  are  right-­wing  in  their  rejection  of  individual  and  social  equality,  in  their  opposition  to  the  social  integration  of  
marginalized  groups,  and  in  their  appeal  to  xenophobia,  if  not  overt  racism.  They  are  populist  in  their  
instrumentalization  of  sentiments  of  anxiety  and  disenchantment  and  their  appeal  to  the  common  man  and  his  
allegedly  superior  common  sense  17   	  	   In	  forming	  his	  own	  definition	  of	  right	  wing	  populism,	  Cas	  Mudde	  takes	  a	  slightly	  different	  approach	  from	  Betz.	  Mudde	  first	  differentiates	  between	  a	  ǲminimum	  definitionǳ	  and	  a	  ǲmaximum	  definitionǳ	  of	  right	  wing	  populism18.	  To	  form	  a	  minimum	  definition,	  or	  a	  less	  extensive	  definition	  of	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party,	  Mudde	  believes	  that	  one	  must	  identify	  the	  ǲcore	  conceptǳ	  of	  right	  wing	  populism	  that	  is	  most	  essential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  	  Betz,	  p.	  415	  16	  ǡǤǲThe	  Danish	  People's	  Party,	  the	  Italian	  Northern	  League	  and	  the	  Austrian	  Freedom	  Party	  in	  a	  Comparative	  Perspective:	  Party	  Ideology	  and	  ElectoǳǤDiscertation	  17	  Betz,	  Hans-­‐George.	  The	  New	  Politics	  of	  Resentment:	  Radical	  Right	  Wing	  Populist	  Parties	  in	  
Western	  Europe.	  Comparative  Politics  ,  Vol.  25,  No.  4  (Jul.,  1993)  ,  pp.  413-­427.  P.  415  18	  Mudde,	  Cass.	  2007	  p.	  15.	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to	  understanding	  its	  worldview.	  A	  shared	  belief	  in	  this	  ǲcore	  conceptǳwill	  be	  the	  factor	  which	  unites	  all	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  into	  the	  same	  party	  family.	  	  	  	   For	  Mudde,	  identifying	  this	  core	  concept	  was	  not	  exceedingly	  difficult.	  	  He	  first	  considers	  the	  possibility	  that	  ǲǳis	  the	  core	  concept	  that	  connects	  all	  far	  right	  populist	  parties.	  However,	  Mudde	  ultimately	  decides	  that	  nationalism	  is	  too	  broad	  of	  a	  term	  for	  the	  core	  concept.	  While	  it	  is	  certainly	  true	  that	  far	  right	  populist	  parties	  champion	  national	  pride,	  this	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  wholly	  unique	  to	  far	  right	  parties,	  as	  many	  liberal	  and	  moderate	  parties	  espouse	  similar,	  albeit	  less	  brash	  forms	  of	  nationalism19.	  ǡǲǳa	  good	  encapsulation	  of	  far	  right	  
ǯǡhalf	  of	  the	  equation;	  Far	  right	  parties	  are	  defined	  not	  just	  by	  their	  belief	  ǲ
ǳso	  by	  their	  belief	  ǲǳof	  things.	  	  	   It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  Mudde	  chooses	  ǲnativismǳ	  as	  the	  core	  concept	  of	  far	  right	  populist	  parties,	  as	  Mudde	  defines	  the	  term	  as	  ǲan	  ideology	  which	  holds	  that	  states	  should	  be	  inhabited	  exclusively	  by	  members	  of	  the	  native	  group	  (the	  nation)	  and	  that	  nonnative	  elements	  (persons	  and	  ideas)	  are	  fundamentally	  threatening	  to	  the	  homogenous	  nation-­‐stateǳ20.	  For	  Mudde,	  a	  political	  party	  should	  be	  considered	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  if	  it	  campaigns	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  nativism,	  regardless	  of	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Mudde,	  Cas,	  2007.	  p.	  19	  20	  Mudde,	  Cas.	  2007	  p.	  19	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economics	  or	  foreign	  policy.	  Different	  far	  right	  parties	  can	  disagree	  on	  any	  number	  of	  issues,	  but	  so	  long	  as	  both	  advocate	  for	  nativist	  policies,	  then	  both	  meet	  the	  minimum	  definition	  of	  a	  far	  right	  party.	  	  	   ǯa	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  obviously	  has	  a	  stricter	  set	  of	  criteria.	  Nativist	  ideology	  remains	  the	  only	  vital	  condition	  for	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party,	  but	  for	  the	  maximum	  definition	  Mudde	  identifies	  two	  additional	  core	  concepts.	  In	  addition	  to	  nativism,	  the	  maximum	  definition	  requires	  that	  a	  party	  be	  
ǡǲǡ
ǳ21.	  A	  party	  must	  also	  be	  populist,	  which	  Mudde	  defines	  as	  an	  ideology	  that	  ǲ
ǡǯǯǮǯ22.	  A	  party	  that	  fits	  the	  minimum	  definition	  of	  right	  wing	  populism	  will	  hold	  a	  nativist	  worldview,	  while	  a	  party	  that	  fits	  the	  maximum	  definition	  will	  go	  to	  greater	  depths	  to	  promote	  and	  implement	  this	  worldview.	  	  If	  a	  party	  endorses	  all	  three	  of	  these	  core	  concepts,	  then	  it	  fits	  the	  maximum	  definition	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party.	  	  	   ǯǯhe	  characterizes	  right	  wing	  populism	  as	  a	  belief	  in	  a	  nativist	  social	  hierarchy	  fostered	  by	  anti-­‐establishment	  politics.	  However,	  unlike	  Betz,	  Mudde	  does	  not	  place	  any	  emphasis	  on	  neo-­‐liberalism	  in	  his	  definition.	  	  In	  fact	  he	  makes	  no	  mention	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  consistent	  economic	  philosophy	  that	  is	  shared	  by	  all	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  To	  Mudde,	  right	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Mudde,	  Cas.	  2007	  p.	  22	  22	  Mudde,	  Cas.	  2007	  p.	  23	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wing	  populist	  parties	  are	  defined	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  their	  nativism,	  and	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	  to	  espouse	  similar	  economic	  principles	  in	  order	  to	  be	  categorized	  into	  the	  same	  party	  family.	  	  	   In	  forming	  his	  own	  definition,	  Richard	  Saull	  views	  right	  wing	  populism	  in	  a	  broader	  sense.	  Saull	  does	  not	  see	  nativism	  itself	  as	  the	  sole	  component	  of	  a	  right	  wing	  ideology,	  but	  rather	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  idea	  of	  wanting	  to	  uphold	  traditional	  societal	  norms.	  According	  to	  Saull,	  when	  viewing	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  strictly	  on	  ideological	  terms,	  there	  is	  actually	  not	  a	  great	  deal	  that	  separates	  them	  from	  more	  traditional	  conservative	  parties.	  He	  notes	  that	  both	  far	  right	  parties	  and	  mainstream	  conservative	  parties	  share	  an	  ǲidealization	  of	  the	  past,	  a	  sense	  of	  cultural	  pessimism	  and	  an	  importance	  attached	  to	  what	  are	  regarded	  Ǯǳ23.	  However,	  a	  major	  difference	  between	  right	  wing	  populists	  and	  more	  traditional	  conservatives	  is	  that	  conservatives	  concern	  themselves	  with	  preserving	  the	  status	  quo,	  while	  far	  right	  parties	  actively	  attempt	  to	  implement	  reactionary	  policies	  that	  would	  return	  their	  respective	  nations	  to	  a	  ǲbetter	  timeǳ24.	  	  Moreover,	  traditional	  conservative	  parties	  consistently	  champion	  the	  virtues	  of	  individualism,	  with	  respect	  to	  both	  economic	  freedom	  and	  individual	  rights.	  Most	  far	  right	  parties	  extol	  similar	  individualist	  rhetoric.	  However,	  ǯunenlightened	  views	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Saull,	  Richard.	  2013.	  "Capitalism,	  crisis	  and	  the	  far-­‐right	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era".	  Journal	  of	  
International	  Relations	  and	  Development.	  p.5-­‐6  24	  Saull,	  p.	  6	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on	  race	  and	  gender	  are	  incompatible	  with	  this	  understanding	  of	  individualism.	  Saull	  finds	  that:	  	   the	  far-­‐right	  ideological	  armoury	  consists	  of	  a	  tendency	  towards	  xenophobia,	  	   Ǯǯ	   inequalities	  in	  the	  spheres	  of	  gender,	  race,	  nationality	  and	  ethnicity,	  that	  combine	  	   with	  a	  strong	  dosage	  of	  anti-­‐individualism	  whereby	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  	   individual	  is	  supposed	  to	  submit	  to	  the	  will	  of	  the	  nation	  via	  the	  state.	  This	  anti-­‐	   individualism25.	  	   	  
ǯǡright	  wing	  populism	  shares	  some	  important	  viewpoints	  with	  traditional	  conservatism,	  its	  reactionary	  and	  authoritarian	  views	  with	  respect	  to	  minorities	  makes	  it	  an	  entirely	  distinct	  ideology.	  	  	   Scholars	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  general	  agreement	  as	  to	  the	  core	  principles	  of	  right	  wing	  populism.	  However,	  while	  ǲright	  wing	  populistǳ	  is	  a	  widely	  used	  phrase	  to	  describe	  these	  parties,	  there	  is	  no	  wide-­‐ranging	  consensus	  that	  it	  should	  be	  the	  official	  terminology.	  Over	  the	  years,	  scholars	  have	  used	  dozens	  different	  terms	  to	  describe	  these	  parties.	  Just	  a	  few	  of	  the	  most	  common	  terms	  include:	  extreme	  right,	  far	  right,	  radical	  right,	  right,	  national	  populist,	  new	  populist,	  exclusionary	  populist,	  xenophobic	  populist,	  ethno-­‐national	  populist,	  natvist,	  post	  fascist,	  and	  reactionary	  tribalist26.	  While	  it	  would	  be	  preferable	  for	  scholars	  to	  have	  more	  uniformity	  in	  their	  terminology,	  ultimately	  this	  wide	  variation	  in	  terms	  has	  not	  significantly	  hampered	  the	  study	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  As	  Mudde	  ǡǲwe	  know	  who	  they	  are,	  even	  though	  we	  do	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Saull,	  p.	  7	  26	  Mudde,	  Cas.	  2007.	  Populist	  radical	  right	  parties	  in	  Europe.	  Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  p.	  11-­‐12	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know	  exactly	  what	  they	  are27ǳǤIndeed,	  even	  though	  scholars	  may	  disagree	  on	  criteria	  or	  semantics,	  and	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  of	  these	  parties	  disagree	  on	  certain	  policy	  issues,	  there	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  far-­‐reaching	  consensus	  as	  to	  which	  parties	  should	  be	  categorized	  into	  this	  party	  family.	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  these	  parties	  as	  right	  wing	  populist,	  and	  even	  though	  I	  will	  cite	  authors	  who	  use	  various	  different	  terminologies,	  the	  material	  will	  nonetheless	  be	  applicable	  to	  this	  topic.	  	  	  
Ties	  to	  Fascism	  and	  Neo-­‐Nazis	  
	   It	  should	  also	  be	  noted	  that	  despite	  a	  few	  significant	  similarities,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  are	  distinct	  from	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  and	  Neo-­‐fascist	  parties,	  and	  should	  not	  be	  categorized	  into	  the	  same	  party	  family.	  Some	  scholars	  understandably	  draw	  parallels	  between	  the	  contemporary	  right	  wing	  populist	  movement	  and	  the	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  movement.	  After	  all,	  both	  are	  staunchly	  anti-­‐immigrant	  and	  both	  are	  known	  to	  use	  authoritarian	  and	  anti-­‐statist	  rhetoric.	  However,	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  cannot	  be	  equated	  with	  Neo-­‐Nazism	  if	  only	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  Neo-­‐Nazism	  by	  definition	  refers	  to	  any	  social	  or	  political	  movement	  seeking	  to	  revive	  National	  Socialism28.	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  parties	  openly	  and	  emphatically	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  whites	  are	  the	  master	  race	  and	  that	  they	  should	  be	  the	  dominant	  ethnic	  group	  in	  society.	  The	  National	  Democratic	  Party	  of	  Germany,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  party	  in	  Europe,	  referred	  to	  the	  election	  of	  Barack	  Obama	  as	  the	  ǲ"the	  American	  alliance	  of	  Jews	  and	  Negroes"	  and	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Mudde,	  Cas.	  1996.	  The	  War	  of	  Words.	  Defining	  the	  Extreme	  Right	  Party	  Family.	  In:	  West	  European	  Politics,	  19:	  225Ȃ248.	  p.	  233  28	  McGowan,	  Lee	  (2002).	  The	  Radical	  Right	  in	  Germany:	  1870	  to	  the	  Present.	  Pearson	  Education.	  pp.	  9,	  178	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ǲǳ29.	  Though	  there	  are	  certainly	  those	  who	  would	  label	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  as	  racist,	  but	  even	  they	  would	  concede	  that	  RPPs	  would	  not	  publicly	  use	  racial	  slurs.	  Furthermore,	  Neo-­‐Nazism	  is	  defined	  under	  Austrian	  law	  as	  follows:	  	  Neo-­‐Nazism,	  a	  legal	  term,	  is	  understood	  as	  the	  attempt	  to	  propagate,	  in	  direct	  defiance	  of	  the	  law	  (Verbotsgesetz),	  Nazi	  ideology	  or	  measures	  such	  as	  the	  denial,	  playing-­‐down,	  approval	  or	  justification	  of	  Nazi	  mass	  murder,	  especially	  the	  Holocaust30	  	  Even	  scholars	  who	  openly	  accuse	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  of	  being	  racist	  or	  xenophobic	  do	  not	  go	  as	  far	  to	  align	  them	  with	  such	  ideas.	  Moreover,	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  parties	  are	  also	  commonly	  known	  to	  ǲadvocate	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  democratic	  order	  or	  the	  use	  of	  violenceǳ31.	  Right	  wing	  populist	  parties,	  while	  generally	  thought	  of	  as	  radical,	  do	  not	  as	  a	  whole	  endorse	  violent	  or	  illegal	  means	  to	  take	  over	  the	  government.	  Finally,	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  parties	  are	  frequently	  anti-­‐capitalist,	  	  a	  clear	  contrast	  to	  the	  neo-­‐liberalism	  commonly	  advocated	  by	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties32.	  Moreover,	  it	  should	  be	  acknowledged	  that	  all	  major	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  outright	  deny	  any	  ties	  to	  a	  Neo-­‐Nazi	  or	  Neo-­‐fascist	  parties33.	  While	  many	  scholars	  find	  certain	  right	  wing	  rhetoric	  to	  be	  worrisome,	  most	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  ǡǲCalls	  for	  prosecution	  after	  German	  politician	  says	  Obama	  win	  'a	  deǳelegraph.co.uk,	  11	  November	  2008.	  30	  Brigitte	  Bailer-­‐Galanda;	  Wolfgang	  Neugebauer.	  "Right-­‐Wing	  Extremism	  in	  Austria:	  History,	  Organisations,	  Ideology".	  	  Stiftung	  Dokumentationsarchiv	  des	  österreichischen	  
Widerstandes.	  p.5-­‐21.	  31	  Laqueur,	  Walter,	  Fascism:	  Past,	  Present,	  Future,	  p.	  117-­‐118	  32Art,	  David	  The	  Politics	  of	  Nazi	  Past	  in	  Germany	  and	  Austria.	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  P.	  91	  33	  Price,	  Nathan.	  "The	  Resurgence	  of	  the	  Radical-­‐Right	  in	  Western	  European	  Politics:	  Analysis	  of	  the	  French,	  Italian,	  Austrian,	  and	  Belgian	  Cases"	  Paper	  presented	  at	  the	  annual	  meeting	  of	  the	  Midwest	  Political	  Science	  Association	  67th	  Annual	  National	  Conference,	  The	  Palmer	  House	  Hilton,	  Chicago,	  IL,	  Apr	  02,	  2009	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  success	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  Europe	  has	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  electoral	  systems,	  some	  seemingly	  more	  favorable	  to	  minority	  parties	  than	  others.	  Below	  is	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  some	  of	  the	  different	  electoral	  systems	  in	  Europe:	  	   Proportional	  systems:	  In	  a	  proportional	  system,	  the	  amount	  of	  representatives	  a	  party	  has	  in	  parliament	  is	  roughly	  equal	  to	  the	  percentage	  of	  vote	  it	  receives	  in	  the	  election34.	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  party	  were	  to	  receive	  27%	  of	  the	  vote	  and	  another	  15%,	  then	  they	  would	  be	  represented	  in	  a	  one	  hundred-­‐seat	  parliament	  with	  27	  and	  15	  seats	  respectively.	  In	  proportional	  systems	  voters	  select	  a	  political	  party,	  not	  an	  individual	  candidate,	  to	  represent	  them	  in	  government.	  The	  party	  leaders	  ultimately	  determine	  which	  of	  its	  politicians	  will	  fill	  its	  awarded	  seats	  based	  on	  party-­‐lists,	  and	  the	  voters	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  who	  are	  on	  these	  lists35.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Norris,	  Pippa.	  1997.	  "Choosing	  Electoral	  Systems:	  Proportional,	  Majoritarian	  and	  Mixed	  Systems".	  International	  Political	  Science	  Review.	  18	  (3):	  297-­‐312.	  p.	  297	  35	  Norris,	  p.	  302	  
	  	   20	  
	   Plurality	  systems:	  A	  plurality	  system,	  ǲ-­‐past-­‐the-­‐ǳ	  system,	  employs	  winner-­‐take-­‐all	  style	  elections	  in	  which	  only	  the	  candidate	  that	  receives	  the	  most	  votes	  in	  a	  given	  electoral	  district	  will	  be	  elected	  into	  office.	  A	  candidate	  does	  not	  need	  to	  receive	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  vote	  (greater	  than	  fifty	  percent),	  only	  one	  more	  vote	  than	  his	  or	  her	  opponent(s).	  In	  a	  first	  past	  the	  post	  system,	  there	  could	  be	  a	  scenario	  in	  which	  one	  candidate	  receives	  35%	  of	  the	  vote,	  while	  the	  other	  contestants	  get	  34%	  and	  32%	  respectively.	  Though	  opinion	  on	  the	  three	  candidates	  is	  evenly	  divided,	  only	  the	  candidate	  who	  receives	  35%	  will	  be	  put	  into	  office;	  in	  effect,	  only	  35%	  of	  voters	  will	  get	  to	  have	  their	  views	  represented	  in	  government.	  The	  result	  
ǲǳ	  in	  which	  the	  share	  of	  seats	  for	  the	  winning	  party	  is	  deliberately	  exaggerated	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  an	  effective	  ruling	  faction.	  As	  Norris	  explainsǡǲThe	  focus	  is	  effective	  governance,	  not	  the	  representation	  of	  
ǳ36.	  Minority	  voices,	  at	  least	  in	  theory,	  are	  suppressed	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  getting	  things	  done.	  	  	   Second	  Ballot-­‐Runoff	  Systems:	  This	  system	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  that	  an	  elected	  candidate	  has	  broad	  support	  of	  the	  electorate.	  Under	  this	  system,	  also	  known	  as	  a	  two-­‐round	  system,	  candidates	  who	  do	  not	  receive	  a	  certain	  percentage	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  first	  round	  are	  eliminated,	  and	  voters	  will	  then	  choose	  from	  a	  smaller	  list	  of	  candidates	  in	  the	  second	  round.	  There	  a	  two	  kinds	  of	  runoffs,	  a	  majority	  runoff	  where	  it	  is	  absolutely	  necessary	  that	  a	  candidate	  receive	  greater	  than	  fifty	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  or	  a	  plurality	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Norris,	  p.	  298	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runoff	  in	  which	  the	  candidate	  with	  the	  highest	  number	  of	  votes	  in	  the	  second	  round	  will	  be	  elected37	  .	  	  
	   None	  of	  these	  electoral	  systems	  have	  set	  rules	  on	  how	  many	  parties	  are	  allowed	  to	  participate.	  However,	  it	  almost	  always	  works	  out	  that	  counties	  with	  plurality	  systems	  will	  have	  two,	  sometimes	  three	  major	  parties,	  while	  countries	  with	  proportional	  systems	  will	  have	  many	  more	  viable	  parties.	  	  This	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  
ǯ,	  which	  states	  that	  ǲThe	  simple-­‐majority	  single-­‐ballot	  system	  favours	  the	  two-­‐party	  systemǳ38.	  If	  voters	  know	  that	  only	  one	  candidate	  will	  be	  elected	  into	  parliament,	  then	  they	  will	  inevitably	  end	  up	  voting	  for	  one	  of	  the	  major	  candidates,	  as	  not	  to	  waste	  their	  vote.	  Empirical	  results	  would	  seem	  to	  support	  this	  theory.	  The	  United	  States,	  Canada,	  and	  the	  UK,	  all	  countries	  with	  plurality	  systems,	  only	  have	  two	  or	  (arguably)	  three	  major	  parties.	  Meanwhile,	  almost	  every	  country	  with	  proportional	  representation	  regularly	  has	  four	  or	  five	  major	  parties	  elected	  into	  government.	  	  	   Pippa	  Norris	  hypothesizes	  that	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  must	  be	  in	  a	  country	  with	  a	  proportional	  system	  in	  order	  to	  succeed,	  as	  these	  kind	  of	  elections	  result	  in	  multi-­‐party	  systems	  in	  which	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  viewpoints	  are	  represented.	  	  A	  party	  will	  only	  need	  a	  small	  vote	  share	  in	  order	  to	  get	  into	  the	  national	  parliament,	  which	  means	  that	  politicians	  can	  more	  freely	  embrace	  radical	  views.	  Perhaps	  anti-­‐immigration	  or	  anti-­‐Muslim	  stances	  would	  not	  win	  the	  support	  of	  fifty	  percent	  of	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Norris,	  p.	  300	  38	  Duverger,	  M.	  (1959)	  Political	  Parties:	  Their	  Organization	  and	  Activity	  in	  the	  Modern	  State.	  Second	  English	  Revised	  edn.	  London:	  Methuen	  &	  Co.	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electorate,	  but	  in	  countries	  like	  Austria	  and	  Switzerland	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  win	  the	  support	  of	  twenty-­‐five	  to	  thirty	  percent;	  and	  in	  countries	  with	  multi-­‐party	  systems	  that	  is	  all	  that	  is	  necessary	  to	  gain	  significant	  power.	  If	  these	  countries	  did	  not	  award	  seats	  in	  parliament	  based	  on	  proportional	  representation,	  then	  they	  would	  likely	  have	  two	  party	  systems	  that	  would	  greatly	  diminish	  the	  relevance	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  	  	   ǯo	  applies	  to	  a	  two-­‐round	  system.	  Since	  only	  one	  candidate	  will	  be	  chosen,	  ǯround.	  	  An	  	ǯelections	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly	  indicate	  that	  it	  is	  exceedingly	  difficult	  for	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  to	  succeed	  in	  countries	  with	  two-­‐round	  elections.	  Front	  National	  has	  always	  done	  well	  in	  opinion	  polls,	  and	  consistently	  gains	  support	  from	  more	  than	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  electorate	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections.	  	  However,	  Front	  National	  has	  not	  usually	  been	  able	  to	  make	  it	  into	  the	  second	  round	  of	  national	  elections,	  and	  when	  it	  does	  it	  is	  almost	  always	  soundly	  defeated.	  Since	  the	  second	  round	  the	  ballot	  is	  often	  limited	  to	  the	  top	  two	  or	  three	  vote	  getters,	  it	  has	  not	  been	  able	  to	  translate	  this	  significant	  amount	  of	  support	  into	  any	  kind	  of	  tangible	  political	  power.	  	  
Voter	  Apathy/Declining	  Participation	  	   Scholars	  are	  currently	  debating	  just	  what	  effect,	  if	  any,	  voter	  turnout	  has	  on	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  Though	  they	  still	  have	  higher	  turnouts	  than	  the	  United	  States,	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voter	  turnout	  has	  been	  steadily	  declining	  in	  Europe	  over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years39.	  Some	  have	  pointed	  to	  this	  statistic	  as	  a	  causal	  factor	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  This	  line	  of	  reasoning	  follows	  the	  conventional	  wisdom	  that	  lower	  turnout	  tends	  to	  benefit	  radical	  parties,	  as	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  a	  more	  motivated	  and	  radicalized	  base	  will	  show	  up,	  thus	  ensuring	  that	  radical	  parties	  will	  receive	  a	  higher	  percentage	  of	  the	  vote.	  However,	  the	  studies	  examining	  this	  theory	  with	  respect	  to	  RPPs	  in	  Western	  Europe	  have	  been	  inconclusive	  at	  best.	  	  	   After	  analyzing	  the	  most	  recent	  Norwegian	  elections,	  Henning	  Finseraas	  and	  Kåre	  Vernby	  concluded	  that	  the	  far	  right	  Norwegian	  Progress	  Party	  actually	  benefited	  from	  a	  higher	  voter	  turnout40.	  Their	  findings	  show	  that	  low-­‐income	  voters,	  historically	  a	  group	  with	  low	  turnout,	  came	  out	  to	  support	  the	  Norwegian	  Progress	  Party	  in	  such	  high	  numbers	  that	  the	  party	  gained	  seats	  even	  though	  turnout	  was	  high	  across	  the	  board41.	  Moreover,	  empirical	  data	  from	  other	  European	  elections	  would	  call	  into	  question	  the	  notion	  that	  lower	  voter	  turnout	  benefits	  far	  right	  parties.	  The	  chart	  below	  measures	  the	  vote	  shares	  for	  the	  major	  Austrian	  parties	  in	  four	  European	  Parliamentary	  elections.	  In	  the	  1996	  European	  Parliamentary	  elections,	  the	  FPÖ	  received	  had	  its	  best	  showing	  in	  European	  Parliamentary	  elections.	  Voter	  turnout	  for	  that	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  ǲͳͻͶͷǳElectoral	  Assistance.	  2004	  p.	  8	  40	  Finseraas	  ,	  Henning;	  Vernby,Kåre	  	  ǲǫrly	  Voting,	  Turnout,	  
ǳAssociation	  Annual	  Conference,	  2013	  p.	  2	  41	  Finseraas	  ,	  Henning;	  Vernby,Kåre	  	  p.	  7	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year	  was	  67.7%.	  Each	  successive	  election	  shows	  the	  voter	  turnout	  decreasing,	  yet	  the	  FPÖ,	  the	  most	  radical	  party,	  does	  worse	  each	  time.	  Obviously,	  there	  were	  numerous	  other	  factors	  that	  influenced	  the	  election,	  so	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  that	  the	  FPÖ	  benefited	  from	  lower	  turnout	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  vote	  share	  decreased.	  Still,	  such	  results	  would	  call	  into	  question	  the	  idea	  that	  radical	  parties	  automatically	  benefit	  from	  low	  voter	  turnout.	  	  
	  Figue	  2.1	  Taken	  from	  Pelinka,	  Anton	  and	  Rosenberger,	  Sieglinde	  Österreichische	  Politik:	  Grundlagen	  -­‐	  
Strukturen	  Ȃ	  Trends	  2007	  p.	  171	  	   	  While	  the	  theory	  has	  not	  been	  definitively	  disproven,	  there	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  any	  strong	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  theory	  that	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  automatically	  benefit	  from	  low	  voter	  turnout.	  	  	   Immigration	  
	   Anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment	  unquestionably	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  success	  of	  far	  right	  populist	  parties.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  few	  areas	  of	  nigh-­‐universal	  agreement	  among	  scholars.	  The	  chart	  below	  shows	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  high	  levels	  of	  immigration	  in	  a	  country	  and	  the	  success	  of	  far	  right	  parties	  in	  that	  country.	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  Figure	  2.2:	  	  Taken	  from	  Halla,  Martin  and  Wagner,  Alexander  F.  and  Zweimüller,  Josef,  Immigration  and  Voting  
for  the  Extreme  Right  (October  25,  2013).  Available  at  SSRN:  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103623  or  
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2103623  	  The	  fact	  far	  right	  parties	  do	  well	  in	  countries	  with	  high	  levels	  of	  immigration	  does	  not	  itself	  prove	  that	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment	  fuels	  the	  success	  of	  the	  far	  right,	  as	  correlation	  does	  not	  prove	  causation.	  However,	  numerous	  studies	  have	  affirmed	  that	  a	  large	  number	  of	  voters	  support	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  precisely	  because	  of	  their	  staunch	  opposition	  to	  immigration.	  A	  study	  by	  Elizabeth	  Ivarsflaten	  compared	  possible	  motivations	  for	  right	  wing	  support	  and	  found	  that	  immigration	  was	  a	  far	  more	  significant	  motivating	  factor	  among	  right	  wing	  voters	  than	  economic	  views	  or	  protest	  voting42	  and	  that	  when	  compared	  against	  all	  other	  factors,	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  ǡȋʹͲͲ͹Ȍǲ-­‐Wing	  Populists	  in	  Western	  Europe?	  Re-­‐
ǳǤComparative	  Political	  Studies.	  January	  2008	  vol.	  41	  no.	  1	  3-­‐23	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was	  the	  primary	  voting	  motivation	  for	  right	  wing	  voters.	  	  Moreover,	  similar	  studies	  by	  Gibson43,	  Fennema44,	  Rydgren45,	  and	  Mudde46	  all	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment	  is	  the	  strongest	  predictor	  for	  right	  wing	  populist	  voting.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  a	  widely	  accepted	  truth	  among	  scholars	  that	  voters	  support	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  primarily	  due	  to	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment.	  	  The	  task	  then,	  is	  not	  to	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment	  motivates	  right	  wing	  voters,	  but	  to	  identify	  the	  primary	  source	  behind	  that	  sentiment.	  	  	   	  To	  address	  this	  very	  question,	  Daniel	  Oesch	  put	  forward	  two	  possible	  explanations	  for	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment:	  economic	  protectionism	  and	  cultural	  protectionism.	  Economic	  protectionism	  hypothesizes	  that	  voters	  support	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  ǲ
ǡǡǡǳ47	  while	  cultural	  protectionism	  hypothesizes	  that	  voters	  support	  right	  wing	  populist	  primarily	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  defend	  their	  national	  identity	  ǲmulticulturalism	  and	  their	  rejection	  of	  equal	  rights	  for	  foreign	  citizens48ǳ.	  	  When	  testing	  these	  two	  hypotheses	  against	  one	  another,	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  Gibson	  Rachel	  Kay,	  The	  Growth	  of	  Anti-­‐Immigration	  Parties	  in	  Western	  Europe	  (Lewiston,	  NY:	  Edwin	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  Press	  2002)   44	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  (2005),	  Populist	  parties	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  right,	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  Movements	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  Journal	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  Research.	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Oeschǯrameters	  are	  perhaps	  not	  as	  consequential	  to	  right	  wing	  support	  as	  one	  might	  assume,	  and	  that	  the	  right	  wing	  populist	  electorate	  
ǲǯǯ
ǯǳ49.	  	  	  
Analysis	  of	  Scholarly	  Literature	  	   In	  reviewing	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  from	  the	  most	  prominent	  authors	  in	  the	  field,	  I	  have	  indentified	  three	  main	  theories	  as	  to	  why	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  dramatically	  increased	  their	  vote	  shares	  over	  the	  last	  thirty	  years.	  They	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  	   1.	  ǲThe	  Effect	  of	  Proportional	  Systemsǳ-­‐	  If	  a	  country	  has	  a	  proportional	  system,	  then	  	   a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  is	  exceedingly	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  elected	  into	  	   government.	  Conversely,	  it	  is	  virtually	  impossible	  for	  a	  far-­‐right	  party	  to	  gain	  a	  	   significant	  vote	  share	  if	  it	  is	  in	  a	  country	  that	  does	  not	  have	  a	  proportional	  system.	  	  	  	   	   	  	   2.	  ǲCulturally	  motivated	  anti-­‐immigration	  Sentimentǳ-­‐	  Many	  voters	  are	  	   uncomfortable	  with	  the	  cultural	  shifts	  brought	  about	  by	  an	  influx	  of	  immigrants,	  	   particularly	  those	  from	  Arab	  countries.	  Therefore,	  they	  support	  right-­‐wing	  populist	  	   parties	  because	  of	  their	  anti-­‐immigration	  policies.	  	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	  	   3.	  ǲEconomically	  Motivated	  anti-­‐immigration	  Sentimentǳ-­‐	  Many	  voters	  see	  	   immigrants	  as	  competition	  for	  jobs	  and	  entitlements.	  Therefore,	  they	  support	  	   right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  for	  their	  anti-­‐immigration	  policies.	  	  	   	   	  	   	  From	  these	  theories	  I	  developed	  the	  following	  hypotheses:	  	  
x Hypothesis #1: Cultural factors are most responsible for the success of right wing 
populist parties.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Oesch,	  p.	  370	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x Hypothesis #2: Economic factors are most responsible for the success of right wing 
populist parties.   
x Hypothesis #3: Structural factors are most responsible for the success of right wing 
populist parties.   	   	  	   My	  task	  in	  this	  paper	  will	  be	  to	  test	  each	  of	  these	  hypotheses	  in	  my	  three	  case	  studies	  and	  then	  to	  determine	  which	  one(s)	  best	  explain	  for	  the	  recent	  resurgence	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties.	  I	  do	  this	  with	  the	  understanding	  that	  these	  theories	  are	  not	  mutually	  exclusive.	  It	  is	  certainly	  possible	  that	  all	  three	  hypotheses	  are	  true	  to	  an	  extent,	  but	  they	  cannot	  all	  be	  equally	  responsible	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  far	  right	  populist	  parties.	  In	  my	  conclusion,	  I	  will	  assess	  just	  how	  much	  or	  how	  little	  impact	  each	  factor	  had	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  case	  studies.	  	   	  	  
V.	  Case	  Study	  #1:	  Austria	  	  
	   For	  the	  past	  thirty	  years,	  the	  Freiheitliche	  Partei	  Österreichs	  (FPÖ)	  has	  consistently	  been	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  parties	  in	  Austria.	  	  Under	  the	  leadership	  of	  Jörg	  Haider,	  the	  Austrian	  Freedom	  Party	  (FPÖ)	  first	  rose	  to	  prominence	  in	  1990	  when	  it	  received	  16%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  Parliamentary	  Elections.	  Since	  then	  it	  has	  continued	  to	  be	  a	  major	  political	  party,	  gaining	  as	  much	  as	  27%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  1999.	  The	  party	  has	  remained	  reliably	  popular,	  never	  seeing	  its	  vote	  share	  fall	  below	  10%,	  and	  currently	  has	  a	  20.5%	  vote	  share.	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  the	  latest	  polls,	  the	  FPÖ	  is	  expected	  to	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be	  the	  leading	  vote	  getter	  in	  the	  upcoming	  European	  Parliamentary	  elections,	  where	  it	  is	  expected	  to	  receive	  more	  than	  thirty	  percent	  of	  the	  vote50.	  	   In	  examining	  the	  FPÖǯ	  rise	  to	  prominence	  as	  well	  as	  its	  sustained	  electoral	  success,	  I	  will	  try	  and	  determine	  what	  is	  unique	  about	  the	  Austrian	  electorate	  and	  electoral	  system	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  FPÖǯsuccess.	  In	  this	  case	  study	  I	  will	  investigate	  the	  FPÖǯelectoral	  history,	  party	  platform,	  and	  the	  demographics	  and	  prominent	  motivating	  factors	  of	  its	  electorate.	  	  	  
Historical	  Overview	  	  	   The	  Freedom	  Party	  of	  Austria	  (Freiheitliche	  Partei	  Österreichs)	  was	  founded	  in	  1956	  by	  Anton	  Reinthaller.	  From	  its	  outset,	  the	  FPÖ	  ran	  on	  a	  neoliberal	  platform,	  one	  that	  strongly	  extolled	  the	  virtues	  of	  personal	  liberty	  and	  advocated	  for	  less	  government	  interference	  in	  the	  economy,	  creating	  a	  clear	  contrast	  from	  the	  establishment	  parties	  who	  were	  strongly	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  welfare	  state51.	  Throughout	  the	  sixties	  and	  seventies,	  the	  FPÖ	  was	  a	  minor	  party,	  with	  its	  vote	  share	  fluctuating	  between	  five	  and	  eight	  percent.	  After	  the	  election	  of	  1970,	  the	  FPÖ	  struck	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  SPÖ.	  Under	  this	  agreement,	  the	  FPÖ	  	  would	  publicly	  lend	  its	  support	  to	  Chancellor	  Kreisky's	  minority	  government,	  and	  in	  exchange	  the	  SPÖ	  would	  help	  pass	  new	  electoral	  laws	  that	  were	  more	  favorable	  to	  minority	  parties.	  As	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  these	  new	  laws,	  more	  parties	  were	  able	  to	  get	  on	  the	  ballot,	  so	  the	  FPÖ	  was	  able	  to	  increase	  its	  representation	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  poll	  conducted	  by	  Deutsche	  Bank,	  published	  in	  The	  New	  Observer	  March	  11,	  2014	  51	  Meret,	  p.180	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parliament	  without	  raising	  its	  vote	  totals.	  	  	   The	  FPÖ	  truly	  began	  to	  gain	  momentum	  in	  1986	  when	  Jörg	  Haider	  was	  elected	  party	  leader.	  A	  charismatic	  and	  shrewd	  politician,	  Haider	  was	  able	  to	  appeal	  to	  working	  class	  voters	  who	  were	  feeling	  increasingly	  marginalized	  by	  the	  influx	  of	  immigration	  and	  other	  social	  changes.	  Haider	  decided	  that	  FPÖ	  would	  place	  more	  emphasis	  on	  immigration	  in	  its	  national	  platform,	  and	  the	  ǯ	  hard-­‐line	  anti-­‐immigration	  stance	  soon	  became	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  its	  agenda.	  The	  FPÖ	  were	  quick	  to	  see	  positive	  results	  of	  this	  strategy,	  when	  in	  1990	  the	  parties	  vote	  share	  eclipsed	  ten	  percent	  for	  the	  first	  time.	  
ǯinto	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiments,	  Haider	  began	  to	  push	  the	  issue	  even	  more	  aggressively.	  In	  the	  1996	  elections,	  FPÖ	  continued	  to	  campaign	  
Ǥǲǳǡthe	  FPÖ	  proclaimed	  that:	  	  
The  existing  immigration  laws  should  not  be  softened.  Each  potential  immigrant  must  prove  to   
have  a  job  and  an  accommodation.  To  enable  the  return  of  numerous  illegal  immigrants  we  pro-­  
pose  ID  requirements  such  as  exist  in  most  industrial  countries  today.  The  current  practice  of   
granting  citizenship  well  before  the  legally  required  ten  years  should  also  be  stopped52.   	  	   The	  FPÖ	  continued	  to	  gain	  support,	  and	  in	  the	  1999	  it	  received	  27%	  of	  the	  vote,	  making	  it	  the	  second	  most	  popular	  party	  in	  Austria.	  However,	  party	  leaders	  soon	  learned	  that	  there	  were	  certain	  drawbacks	  to	  being	  a	  mainstream	  party.	  	  They	  actually	  found	  it	  difficult	  to	  maintain	  their	  populist,	  anti-­‐establishment	  image	  while	  simultaneously	  being	  a	  leading	  party	  in	  government53.	  Moreover,	  	  	Yǯ-­‐ÖVP	  coalition	  government	  was	  widely	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  	ǲǳǤ	Ǥͳͻͷ	  53	  Meret,	  p.	  192	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criticized	  when	  it	  failed	  to	  deliver	  on	  its	  promise	  to	  reduce	  taxes54.	  These	  factors,	  along	  with	  increased	  tension	  among	  the	  party	  leaders,	  led	  to	  a	  sharp	  decline	  in	  support.	  In	  2002,	  
	Yǯsupport	  had	  dropped	  to	  just	  10	  percent.	  Party	  infighting	  came	  soon	  after,	  and	  a	  result,	  Haider	  left	  the	  party	  in	  2004	  to	  form	  a	  new	  party	  the	  Alliance	  for	  the	  Future	  of	  Austria	  (BZÖ),	  further	  fracturing	  the	  FPÖ.	  ǯǡ	Ychose	  Heinz-­‐Christian	  Strache	  as	  its	  new	  leader,	  and	  the	  party	  has	  since	  returned	  to	  being	  one	  of	  the	  major	  parties	  in	  Austria.	  	  	   Influence	  on	  Policy	  	   Even	  before	  it	  became	  a	  major	  party	  in	  government,	  the	  FPÖ	  aggressively	  pushed	  for	  anti-­‐immigration	  reforms.	  	  In	  1993,	  the	  FPÖ	  launched	  a	  popular	  initiative	  on	  the	  topic	  of	  immigration	  called	  Österreich	  Zuerst!55	  (Austria	  First!)	  The	  goal	  was	  to	  collect	  enough	  signatures	  ǯpolicies	  adopted	  as	  constitutional	  provisionsǤǲAustria	  is	  not	  a	  country	  of	  
ǳ56	  the	  FPÖ	  made	  several	  substantial	  demands,	  including	  the	  introduction	  of	  more	  rigorous	  measures	  against	  immigration,	  more	  efficient	  border	  controls	  and	  expansion	  of	  the	  police	  force.  ǯǲthe	  rules	  for	  achieving	  Austrian	  citizenship,	  tougher	  measures	  against	  immigrants	  abusing	  social	  benefits	  and	  a	  limitation	  of	  the	  percentage	  (no	  more	  than	  30%)	  of	  
ǳ57.	  The	  petition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Meret,	  p.	  187	  55	  Merit,	  p.	  195	  56	  Österreich  Zuerst!  1993,  in  Sully  A.  Melanie,  The  Haider  Phenomenon  (NY:  Columbia  University   
Press  1997),  87-­88.     57	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garnered	  fewer	  than	  400,000	  signatures,	  falling	  well	  below	  ǯ.	  While	  the	  party	  leaders	  were	  disappointed	  by	  the	  result,	  the	  petition	  was	  a	  success	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  brought	  more	  national	  attention	  to	  immigration,	  all	  but	  forcing	  the	  more	  mainstream	  parties	  to	  address	  the	  issue.	  Later	  that	  year,	  the	  SPÖ-­‐ÖVP	  led	  government	  coalition	  passed	  of	  restrictive	  measures	  for	  the	  immigrants	  already	  living	  
Ǥǡǲes	  documented	  information	  about	  their	  working	  permit,	  health	  insurance	  certificate	  and	  a	  
ǳ58.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  coalition	  government	  passed	  these	  measures	  so	  soon	  after	  the	  FPÖ	  lobbied	  for	  immigration	  reform	  shows	  that	  that	  the	  parties	  saw	  the	  appeal	  	Yǯ-­‐immigrant	  message	  and	  that	  
ǲ	Y
ǳ59.	  	  Even	  before	  the	  FPÖ	  had	  attained	  any	  direct	  political	  power,	  its	  activism	  was	  already	  having	  a	  tangible	  influence	  on	  Austrian	  immigration	  policy.	  	    	   Once	  in	  government,	  the	  FPÖ	  had	  more	  power	  to	  exert	  its	  influence	  on	  immigration,	  and	  for	  a	  select	  period	  of	  a	  few	  years	  it	  was	  quite	  successful	  in	  doing	  so.	  In	  2002,	  the	  FPÖ-­‐ÖǲFremdenrechtspaketǳ	  which	  translates	  to	  ǮǮ	  ǳǤFremdenrechtspaket	  was	  a	  comprehensive	  list	  of	  immigration	  laws.	  Most	  notable	  of	  its	  features	  include	  a	  stricter	  set	  of	  conditions	  for	  entry	  and	  re-­‐entry,	  more	  restrictive	  settlement	  and	  residence	  requirements,	  and	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  Comparative	  Perspective:	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  Ideology	  and	  Electoral	  Support 	  58	  Sully  A.  Melanie,  The  Haider  Phenomenon,  (New  York:  East  European  Monographs  1997).  p.  87	  59	  Meret,	  P.	  194	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new	  requirements	  for	  obtaining	  Austrian	  citizenship60.	  Though	  it	  has	  not	  passed	  any	  
ǯǡ	Ö	  has	  still	  kept	  the	  issue	  relevant	  in	  Austrian	  politics.	  The	  FPÖ	  may	  never	  be	  make	  the	  broad	  sweeping	  changes	  to	  Austrian	  that	  it	  desires,	  but	  its	  significant	  legislative	  accomplishments	  prove	  that	  it	  is	  far	  from	  a	  fringe	  movement.	  	  	  
Electorate	  of	  FPÖ	  	   Traditionally,	  supporters	  of	  the	  FPÖǯed	  to	  be	  disproportionately	  male,	  working	  class,	  and	  lacking	  a	  higher	  education.	  However,	  as	  a	  major	  party	  in	  government,	  the	  FPÖ	  currently	  receives	  measurable	  support	  from	  all	  demographics.	  As	  the	  table	  below	  shows,	  the	  FPÖ	  did	  significantly	  better	  with	  men	  in	  the	  in	  the	  1999	  Parliamentary	  election,	  receiving	  31%	  of	  all	  male	  votes	  compared	  to	  22%	  of	  the	  female	  vote.	  The	  FPÖ	  also	  did	  7%	  better	  among	  non-­‐college	  educated	  voters.	  
	  	   Figure	  3.1	  Taken	  from	  ǡǲǳǤǤ	   Publishing,	  1997	  p.	  218	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  The	  breakdown	  becomes	  clearer	  when	  one	  just	  examines	  the	  demographics	  of	  FPÖ	  voters.	  Contrary	  to	  popular	  belief,	  the	  FPÖ	  has	  never	  been	  a	  party	  that	  has	  relied	  solely	  on	  working	  class	  votes.	  	  As	  the	  chart	  below	  demonstrates,	  the	  FPÖ	  has	  always	  drawn	  a	  large	  percentage	  of	  support	  from	  white	  collar	  voters.	  In	  fact,	  its	  support	  from	  white	  collar	  voters	  actually	  surpassed	  its	  support	  from	  blue	  collar	  voters	  in	  1999.	  	  	  
	  
	͵ǤʹǲThe	  HaideǳǡǤʹͳͻ	  	   Moreover,	  while	  the	  FPÖ	  	  does	  well	  with	  voters	  under	  thirty,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  its	  supporters	  are	  middle	  aged.	  Overall	  though,	  FPÖ	  	  has	  a	  relatively	  even	  voting	  distribution	  among	  age	  and	  economic	  standing.	  While	  this	  may	  surprise	  some,	  these	  numbers	  perfectly	  reflect	  the	  reality	  that	  traditional	  cleavages	  are	  much	  less	  relevant	  in	  modern	  European	  politics.	  	  ǡǯǡǡ
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ǯǤowever,	  these	  social	  cleavages	  now	  have	  much	  less	  of	  an	  effect	  ǯbehavior61.	  The	  one	  category	  that	  remains	  to	  be	  an	  accurate	  predictor,	  however,	  is	  gender.	  The	  FPÖ	  continues	  to	  appeal	  to	  men	  at	  a	  much	  higher	  rate	  than	  women.	  	  	  	   Supporters	  of	  the	  FPÖ	  also	  tend	  to	  share	  a	  sharp	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  establishment.	  	  ǲǳin	  charge.	  	  A	  vote	  for	  the	  FPÖ	  was	  also	  a	  vote	  against	  the	  establishment,	  and	  that	  opportunity	  excited	  many	  voters.	  A	  survey	  of	  far	  right	  voters	  in	  Austria	  found	  that:	  	   ǲbetween	  39	  percent	  and	  66	  percent	  of	  the	  FPÖ	  electorate	  in	  the	  1990s	  named	   Ǯǯajor	  motivations	  and	  saw	  the	  FPÖ	  as	  the	  	   Ǯǯs	  62	  	  	   While	  it	  may	  not	  have	  been	  their	  main	  motivating	  factor,	  many	  Austrians	  certainly	  saw	  protest	  voting	  as	  a	  legitimate	  reason	  to	  support	  the	  FPÖ.	  Like	  all	  other	  RPP	  electorates,	  FPÖ	  voters	  see	  establishment	  parties	  as	  part	  of	  the	  problem.	  They	  strongly	  identify	  with	  the	  FPÖ,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  not	  strictly	  for	  policy	  reasons.	  When	  voters	  cast	  their	  votes	  for	  the	  FPÖ	  many	  of	  them	  are	  expecting	  not	  just	  a	  change	  not	  just	  in	  policy,	  but	  also	  in	  tenor.	  	  	   Finally,	  and	  most	  crucially,	  FPÖ	  voters	  are	  united	  by	  their	  hard-­‐line	  stance	  against	  immigration.	  Those	  who	  support	  the	  FPÖ	  almost	  uniformly	  have	  a	  distrust	  of	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ǤǳEuropean	  Journal	  of	  Political	  
Research,	  vol.	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  1998,	  165-­‐185.	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  Inazi,	  Piero	  (2003)	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  Right	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  University	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immigrants	  and	  foreigners,	  and	  many	  support	  the	  FPÖ	  for	  the	  express	  purpose	  of	  limiting	  immigration.	  In	  a	  national	  survey	  of	  FPÖ	  voters,	  it	  was	  found	  that:	  	  	   93	  Percent	  of	  those	  who	  voted	  for	  the	  FPÖ	  wanted	  to	  accept	  only	  a	  few	  	   immigrants	  or	  none	  at	  all.	  This	  should	  be	  compared	  to	  64	  percent	  of	  those	  who	  	   did	  not	  vote	  for	  the	  FPÖ63	  	  Moreover,	  as	  Figure	  3.3	  demonstrates,	  FPÖ	  voters	  tend	  to	  see	  immigrants	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  
ǯǤslight	  majority	  of	  FPÖ	  voters	  believe	  that	  immigrants	  actively	  undermine	  cultural	  life,	  while	  only	  20%	  think	  that	  they	  enrich	  it.	  	  This	  results	  in	  a	  percentage	  difference	  index	  (PDI)	  of	  31%,	  compared	  to	  an	  average	  PDI	  of	  -­‐27%.	  	  FPÖ	  are	  unquestionably	  the	  most	  concerned	  with	  defending	  their	  cultural	  heritage	  from	  the	  perceived	  threat	  of	  immigration.	  	  
Figure	  3.3	  Taken	  from	  Merit,	  p.	  182	  
Heimat	  	   In	  order	  to	  fully	  grasp	  the	  origins	  of	  Austrian	  nationalism,	  one	  must	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  ǲǳǤequivalent	  word	  in	  English,	  Heimat	  roughly	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translates	  to	  ǲhomelandǳ	  but	  is	  also	  more	  generally	  understood	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  having	  love	  
ǯheritage	  and	  country	  of	  birth.	  Heimat	  is	  widely	  understood	  among	  the	  Austrian	  people,	  and	  has	  positive	  connotations	  even	  among	  those	  who	  do	  not	  hold	  antagonistic	  views	  towards	  immigration	  or	  multiculturalism.	  However,	  several	  times	  throughout	  history,	  politicians	  have	  used	  the	  concept	  of	  Heimat	  to	  champion	  nationalist,	  xenophobic,	  or	  racist	  ideals.	  One	  can	  frequently	  hear	  FPÖ	  politicians	  mention	  of	  Heimat	  in	  speeches	  and	  rallies,	  and	  the	  party	  literature	  often	  references	  Heimat.	  	  One	  of	  the	  parties	  slogans	  is:	  Aus	  
Liebe	  zur	  Heimatǯ64(Out	  of	  love	  for	  our	  homeland).	  Moreover,	  the	  concept	  of	  Heimat	  features	  prominently	  in	  the	  FPÖ	  party	  platform,	  which	  proclaims:	  	  Wir	  sind	  dem	  Schutz	  unserer	  Heimat	  Österreich,	  unserer	  nationalen	  Identität	  und	  Eigen-­‐ständigkeit65	  (We	  are	  protecting	  our	  homeland	  Austria,	  our	  national	  identity	  and	  autonomy).	  The	  document	  goes	  on	  to	  say:	  Wir	  bekennen	  uns	  zu	  unserem	  Heimatland	  Österreich	  als	  Teil	  der	  deutschen	  Sprach-­‐	  und	  Kulturgemeinschaft	  (We	  are	  committed	  to	  our	  country,	  Austria,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  German	  language	  and	  cultural	  community).	  Such	  proclamations	  are	  ostensibly	  patriotic,	  but	  have	  clear	  undertones	  that	  suggest	  antagonism	  towards	  immigrants	  and	  foreigners.	  If	  there	  was	  any	  doubt	  of	  the	  FPYǯtendencies,	  one	  only	  need	  to	  observe	  FPÖ	  campaign	  slogans	  which	  make	  the	  following	  statements:	  	  
x Wien	  darf	  nicht,	  was	  Istanbul	  werden66(Vienna	  must	  not	  become	  Istanbul);	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  64	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  Are	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  ǲǤThe	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  October	  2013	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x Dahham	  statt	  Islam	  (Home,	  not	  Islam);	  	  
x Liebe	  deine	  Naechsten.	  Fuer	  mich	  sind	  das	  unsere	  Osterreicher67(Love	  your	  neighbor.	  For	  me	  these	  are	  our	  Austrians).	  	  	  	   Whatever	  its	  prior	  meaning,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  for	  FPÖ	  supporters	  the	  concept	  of	  Heimat	  has	  ǲevolved	  into	  an	  exclusionary	  right	  to	  the	  homelandǳ68.	  	  One	  could	  say	  that	  Heimat	  is	  almost	  a	  code	  word	  among	  the	  FPÖ	  and	  its	  supporters.	  	  By	  constantly	  mentioning	  its	  love	  for	  the	  homeland,	  the	  FPÖ	  can	  ǲargue	  that	  the	  main	  question	  was	  not	  about	  being	  against	  foreigners,	  but	  rather	  about	  safeguarding	  the	  interests	  and	  cultural	  identity	  of	  the	  
ǳǤThe	  FPÖ	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  only	  using	  Heimat	  to	  instill	  pride	  in	  the	  homeland,	  but	  such	  antagonistic	  language	  speaks	  for	  itself.	  	  	   From	  what	  I	  have	  gathered	  from	  empirical	  observation,	  FPÖ	  politicians	  seem	  to	  place	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  cultural	  implications	  of	  immigration	  compared	  to	  the	  economic	  implications.	  From	  observing	  the	  party	  platforms,	  campaign	  slogans,	  and	  stump	  speeches,	  FPÖ	  leaders	  certainly	  seem	  to	  stress	  the	  cultural	  dangers	  of	  immigration	  more	  than	  they	  do	  the	  economic	  dangers.	  This	  is	  not	  strictly	  quantifiable,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  by	  itself	  prove	  that	  cultural	  protectionism	  is	  a	  greater	  motivating	  factor	  than	  economic	  protectionism,	  but	  it	  is	  certainly	  an	  aspect	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  under	  consideration.	  The	  amount	  of	  emphasis	  that	  FPÖ	  party	  leaders	  place	  on	  cultural	  protectionism	  compared	  to	  economic	  protectionism	  is	  certainly	  telling	  of	  which	  issue	  they	  think	  resonates	  more	  with	  voters.	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Euroscepticism	  	   Given	  that	  Austrians	  generally	  place	  a	  strong	  attachment	  to	  their	  national	  identity,	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  they	  would	  be	  skeptical	  of	  any	  institution	  that	  would	  limit	  their	  sovereignty.	  	  Throughout	  the	  entire	  history	  of	  the	  institution,	  the	  Austrian	  people	  have	  held	  an	  overwhelmingly	  negative	  view	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  In	  the	  most	  recent	  poll	  of	  2011,	  only	  37%	  of	  Austrians	  thought	  that	  EU	  membership	  was	  a	  good	  thing,	  compared	  to	  47%	  of	  the	  EU	  average69.	  A	  general	  distrust	  the	  EU	  and	  its	  leaders	  is	  called	  Euroscepticism,	  which	  
ǲǲsition,	  as	  well	  as	  incorporating	  outright	  and	  unqualified	  opposition	  to	  the	  process	  of	  European	  
ǳ70.	  In	  general,	  Austrians	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  like	  the	  idea	  of	  being	  beholden	  to	  a	  foreign	  power.	  In	  fact,	  ǲe	  always	  been	  skeptical	  of	  a	  distant	  capital	  they	  saw	  [as]	  unresponsive,	  if	  not	  actually	  alien	  to	  their	  
ǳ71.	  ǲ
ǳǡFPÖ	  questioned	  the	  idea	  of	  that	  foreign	  powers	  could	  ǯproblems.	  This	  argument	  was	  an	  easy	  sell	  to	  those	  already	  predisposed	  to	  support	  the	  FPÖ,	  as	  Jamie	  Sanders	  believes	  that:	  	  	   It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  mountainous	  Länder	  of	  Carinthia	  and	  Vorarlberg	  are	  where	  the	  FPÖ	  is	  most	  successful.	  	  These	  provinces	  are	  located	  at	  the	  most	  western	  and	  southern	  parts	  of	  Austria	  respectively,	  and	  the	  FPÖ	  cleverly	  uses	  this	  feeling	  of	  being	  misunderstood	  by	  the	  politicians	  in	  Vienna	  to	  their	  advantage.	  If	  these	  alpine	  regions	  feel	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misunderstood	  by	  their	  own	  national	  capital	  then	  it	  is	  only	  natural	  that	  they	  do	  not	  trust	  Brussels,	  which	  is	  located	  even	  further	  away72	  	  	   Even	  more	  so	  than	  most	  Europeans,	  Austrians	  pride	  themselves	  on	  having	  a	  strong	  national	  identity.	  In	  the	  most	  recent	  Euro	  barometer	  from	  2006,	  44%	  of	  the	  
ǲǳǡ6%	  higher	  than	  the	  EU	  average73.	  	  
Figure	  3.4	  Taken	  from	  European	  Social	  Survey	  (2002-­‐2008)	  Moreover,	  the	  chart	  above	  taken	  from	  the	  European	  Social	  Survey	  demonstrates	  a	  fairly	  strong	  correlation	  between	  an	  individual	  voters	  level	  of	  Euroscepticism	  and	  the	  likelihood	  that	  he	  or	  she	  will	  support	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party.	  It	  seems	  only	  natural	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that	  those	  who	  do	  not	  trust	  the	  European	  Union	  would	  be	  significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  political	  parties	  with	  strong	  nationalist	  leanings,	  and	  the	  data	  taken	  from	  Austrian	  voters	  from	  and	  Europe	  as	  a	  whole	  would	  support	  this	  theory.	  	  	   Just	  as	  it	  did	  with	  its	  anti-­‐immigration	  rhetoric,	  the	  FPÖ	  has	  shrewdly	  used	  the	  public	  mistrust	  of	  the	  EU	  to	  its	  political	  advantage.	  When	  Austria	  first	  entered	  the	  EU:	  Jörg	  Haider	  ǲsaw	  a	  chance	  to	  pick	  up	  voters	  disgruntled	  with	  any	  loss	  of	  Austrian	  
ǳ74.	  The	  FPÖ	  uses	  a	  fear	  of	  foreigners	  and	  the	  unknown	  when	  it	  speaks	  on	  immigrants.	  It	  is	  applying	  basically	  the	  same	  principles	  its	  stance	  on	  the	  EU.	  Mainly,	  that	  Austria	  is	  best	  left	  to	  be	  run	  by	  native	  Austrians.	  Its	  uses	  both	  arguments	  to	  gain	  support	  from	  those	  who	  have	  nationalistic	  tendencies.	  	  	  	  
VI.	  Case	  Study	  #2:	  Denmark	  
	   History  Overview  	   The	  Danish	  PeopleǯȋDansk	  Folkeparti,	  DF),	  is	  technically	  the	  newest	  major	  right	  wing	  populist	  party.	  The	  party	  was	  officially	  founded	  in	  1995,	  when	  Pia	  Kjærsgaard	  broke	  off	  from	  the	  previous	  major	  right	  wing	  populist	  party,	  the	  Danish	  Progress	  Party.	  The	  
	ǯ	  was	  immediate;	  in	  its	  first	  election	  in	  1998,	  it	  received	  7.4%	  of	  the	  vote.	  It	  was	  able	  to	  increase	  its	  vote	  share	  to	  12%	  in	  the	  2001	  elections,	  and	  since	  then	  it	  has	  not	  seen	  its	  vote	  share	  fall	  below	  ten	  percent.	  It	  currently	  has	  a	  12.32%	  vote	  share,	  making	  it	  the	  third	  most	  popular	  party	  in	  Denmark.	  Moreover,	  if	  the	  latest	  polls	  are	  proven	  correct,	  the	  
ǯParliament.	  	  The	  party	  ǲͳͷǡ	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for	  May	  22-­‐25,	  were	  held	  now	  -­‐	  outdoing	  both	  the	  Social	  Democrats	  and	  Liberal	  Party,	  long	  
ǳ75.	  If	  this	  prediction	  holds	  true,	  the	  Danǯtime.	  	  
Party  Platform/Positions  
   ǯǲto	  protect	  our	  country,	  its	  people	  and	  
ǳ76.	  	  The	  DF	  party	  platform	  repeatedly	  makes	  reference	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  Danish	  cultural	  heritage	  and	  how	  it	  must	  be	  preserved	  and	  protected.	  The	  party	  quite	  bluntly	  states	  that	  ǲ-­‐country	  and	  never	  has	  been.	  Thus	  we	  will	  not	  accept	  transformation	  tǳ77.	  Consistent	  with	  its	  
ǡǯ	  opposes	  membership	  
ǡǲǳǤDespite	  being	  classified	  as	  a	  right	  ǡǯfirmly	  believes	  in	  protecting	  the	  national	  health	  system,	  adequate	  funding	  for	  education,	  and	  welfare	  programs,	  so	  long	  as	  they	  go	  to	  native	  citizens.	    
Demographics  of  DF  Voters  
   Like	  all	  RPP	  electorates,	  supporterǯby	  a	  staunch	  opposition	  to	  immigration	  and	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  foreigners	  into	  Danish	  society.	  If	  one	  examines	  the	  data	  gathered	  from	  the	  Danish	  Election	  Survey	  from	  1994-­‐2007,	  one	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can	  see	  a	  clear	  contrast	  of	  opinion	  between	  DF	  supporters	  and	  all	  other	  voters	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  immigration.	  Figure	  4.1	  shows	  that	  there	  is	  69%	  PDI	  between	  DF	  voters	  who	  agree	  that	  immigrants	  are	  a	  threat	  to	  national	  culture	  and	  those	  who	  disagree.	  This	  is	  by	  far	  the	  largest	  disparity	  among	  Danish	  parties.	  	  The	  Liberal	  Party	  of	  Denmark	  (V)	  is	  the	  only	  party	  where	  more	  agree	  than	  disagree,	  with	  a	  20%	  PDI.	  	  
	  
	  	   Figure	  4.1	  Taken	  From	  Meret,	  p.	  250	  	   DF	  voters	  are	  also	  the	  electorate	  that	  is	  most	  staunchly	  against	  welfare	  rights	  for	  immigrants,	  though	  admittedly	  its	  PDI	  has	  decreased	  over	  the	  years.	  Even	  so,	  when	  comparing	  where	  each	  electorate	  stands	  on	  public	  spending	  on	  immigration,	  the	  DF	  is	  a	  clear	  outlier.
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   Figure	  4.2	  Taken	  from	  Merit	  p.	  256	  Figure	  4.2	  tracks	  how	  the	  working	  class	  support	  for	  the	  DF	  has	  steadily	  risen	  over	  the	  years,	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  	ǲ
ǳ78Ǥ	ǯpolicies.	  	  	  Even	  though	  they	  are	  a	  right	  wing	  party,	  the	  DF	  has	  had	  to	  change	  its	  position	  to	  appease	  its	  growing	  number	  of	  working	  class	  voters	  who	  ǲplace	  themselves	  at	  the	  centre-­‐left	  of	  the	  economic-­‐ǳ79.	  Whereas	  the	  Danish	  Progress	  Party	  was	  anti-­‐taxes	  and	  anti-­‐ǡǯevolved	  into	  a	  staunchly	  pro-­‐welfare	  party80.	  No	  doubt	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  the	  overrepresentation	  of	  working	  class	  voters	  in	  the	  DF	  electorate.	  	  
	  
VII.	  Case	  Study	  #3:	  France	  	   Front	  National	  first	  rose	  to	  national	  prominence	  in	  1986	  when	  it	  received	  a	  9.8%	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  elections,	  making	  it	  the	  first	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  to	  attain	  such	  a	  large	  vote	  share.	  However,	  it	  would	  find	  this	  success	  to	  be	  short	  lived.	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  the	  1986	  elections	  were	  a	  special	  circumstance.	  The	  Socialist	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Party	  in	  power	  anticipated	  big	  defeat	  in	  the	  1986	  elections,	  so	  its	  members	  voted	  to	  change	  the	  election	  rules	  to	  a	  proportional	  party-­‐list	  system	  in	  order	  to	  preemptively	  reduce	  its	  losses81.	  In	  the	  1988	  elections,	  the	  elections	  reverted	  back	  to	  a	  first	  past	  the	  post	  system.	  	  Front	  National	  once	  again	  received	  9.8%	  of	  the	  vote,	  but	  because	  France	  no	  longer	  used	  a	  proportional	  system,	  it	  saw	  its	  seats	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  decrease	  from	  35	  to	  only	  182.	  Front	  National	  regularly	  receives	  over	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections,	  but	  it	  currently	  finds	  itself	  unable	  to	  translate	  this	  support	  into	  significant	  representation	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  	  Today,	  Front	  National	  is	  arguably	  more	  popular	  than	  it	  was	  in	  the	  eighties.	  	  In	  the	  2012	  elections,	  FN	  received	  13.6%	  in	  the	  first	  round,	  significantly	  higher	  than	  the	  9.8%	  it	  received	  in	  1986,	  but	  under	  the	  present	  two	  round	  voting	  system	  it	  only	  managed	  to	  win	  two	  seats.	  From	  a	  purely	  electoral	  standpoint,	  Front	  National	  has	  found	  its	  first-­‐round	  support	  to	  be	  essentially	  useless.	  	  	  	   The	  chart	  below	  shows	  the	  vote	  percentage	  that	  Front	  National	  has	  received	  in	  Presidential	  and	  regional	  elections	  over	  the	  last	  twenty	  years.	  While	  Front	  National	  has	  struggled	  in	  elections	  for	  the	  National	  Assembly,	  it	  has	  fared	  much	  better	  in	  local	  and	  mayoral	  elections.	  Front	  National	  did	  exceedingly	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  local	  elections,	  where	  it	  became	  the	  leading	  party	  in	  fourteen	  major	  local	  governments83.	  Perhaps	  these	  recent	  elections,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  latest	  poll	  numbers	  for	  the	  European	  Parliament	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  James	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elections,	  serve	  as	  a	  sign	  that	  Front	  National	  is	  well	  on	  its	  way	  to	  overcoming	  its	  barriers	  on	  the	  national	  level	  and	  become	  a	  major	  party	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  	  	  	  
	  Figure	  5.1	  Taken	  from	  Langenbacher,  Nora.  2011.  Is  Europe  on  the  "right"  path?  right-­wing  extremism  and  right-­
wing  populism  in  Europe.  Berlin:  Friedrich-­Ebert-­Stiftung,  Forum  Berlin.  p.  87  	  	   If	  France	  had	  true	  proportional	  representation	  like	  other	  European	  countries,	  many	  would	  expect	  Front	  National	  to	  be	  a	  major	  party	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  However,	  Kai	  Arzeihmer	  is	  not	  so	  sure	  that	  the	  first	  round	  of	  national	  elections	  are	  an	  
	ǯty.	  Arzeihmer	  theorizes	  that	  two	  round	  elections	  are	  a	  kind	  of	  ǲsecurity	  valveǳ	  for	  voters	  in	  that	  they	  can	  
ǲexpress	  their	  political	  frustration	  with	  the	  mainstream	  parties	  without	  overly	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disturbing	  the	  political	  process	  on	  the	  national	  levelǳ84.	  Arzeihmer	  believes	  that	  many	  voters	  are	  supporting	  are	  supporting	  Front	  National	  in	  the	  initial	  round	  simply	  because	  their	  votes	  would	  be	  of	  no	  consequences;	  some	  people	  vote	  for	  far	  right	  simply	  because	  they	  want	  to	  make	  a	  statement	  with	  their	  vote.	  In	  the	  next	  round	  they	  would	  support	  the	  candidate	  that	  they	  actually	  want	  in	  office.	  Arzeihmer	  does	  not	  give	  an	  estimate	  as	  to	  what	  percent	  of	  first	  round	  voters	  FN	  voters	  do	  not	  seriously	  support	  the	  party.	  However,	  the	  1986	  elections	  can	  serve	  as	  proof	  that	  at	  the	  very	  least	  a	  certain	  
	ǯǤn	  1986,	  under	  a	  proportional	  system,	  nearly	  ten	  percent	  of	  the	  French	  electorate	  cast	  their	  vote	  for	  Front	  National,	  even	  though	  they	  knew	  that	  this	  vote	  would	  count.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  some	  first	  round	  votes	  for	  FN	  are	  protest	  votes,	  but	  even	  that	  would	  not	  discount	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  voters	  who	  support	  FN	  in	  the	  first	  round	  do	  so	  sincerely.	  	  
	   Demographics	  of	  FN	  Voters	  	   Joël	  Gombin	  of	  Jules	  Verne	  Picardy	  University,	  who	  describes	  the	  FN	  electorate	  as	  
ǲǳ	as	  it	  does	  ǲthe	  urban	  
	ǳdoes	  not	  have	  many	  supporters	  in	  the	  rural	  West.	  However,	  Gombin	  also	  believes	  that	  this	  urban-­‐rural	  disparity	  may	  be	  dissipating.	  	  Gombin	  finds	  that	  recently	  ǲ	
ǡǳǡǲ-­‐urban	  surroundings	  of	  big	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ǳ85.	  Like	  other	  RPPs,	  Front	  National	  appeals	  to	  working	  class	  voters.	  A	  big	  part	  	ǯappeal	  to	  the	  working	  class	  most	  likely	  derives	  form	  its	  anti-­‐immigration	  and	  anti-­‐islamic	  rhetoric.	  A	  poll	  of	  the	  French	  electorate	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  multiculturalism	  found	  that:	  
two thirds of working class respondents had declared themselves opposed to the construction of mosques (com-  
pared to roughly 40 percent of all respondents); 60 percent of working-class respondents  
had supported a ban on the construction of minarets (compared to 46 percent of all respondents)86	  	  	  
ǡ	ǯto	  immigration	  and	  multiculturalism.	  	   It	  is	  likely	  precisely	  due	  to	  its	  working-­‐class	  support	  that	  FN	  has	  evolved	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  welfare	  state.	  ǡ	ǯ
ǲǳǲǳ87.	  However,	  when	  Front	  National	  began	  to	  get	  more	  support	  from	  lower	  class	  voters,	  it	  
ǲ-­‐liberal	  to	  a	  protectionist	  and	  (in	  some	  aspects)	  welfarist	  
ǳ88Ǥ	ǯ
ǯ.	  Both	  parties	  realized	  that	  it	  had	  to	  adapt	  its	  agenda	  in	  order	  to	  appease	  its	  working	  class	  base,	  and	  as	  a	  result	  both	  parties	  have	  thrived	  in	  recent	  years	  and	  see	  their	  support	  among	  the	  working	  class	  continue	  to	  grow.	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  construction	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  France,	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   Figure	  5.2	  documents	  data	  taken	  from	  an	  ISPOS	  poll	  of	  the	  French	  electorate.	  The	  chart	  compares	  FN	  voter	  attitudes	  on	  issues	  compared	  with	  rest	  of	  the	  electorate.	  Like	  FPO	  voters,	  FN	  voters	  largely	  share	  a	  distrust	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  Front	  National	  in	  presidential	  elections.	  Only	  13%	  of	  FN	  voters	  believe	  that	  EU	  decisions	  that	  negatively	  affect	  France	  should	  be	  honored,	  and	  only	  38%	  of	  FN	  voters	  believe	  that	  France	  should	  even	  be	  part	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  Though	  the	  French	  people	  generally	  hold	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiments,	  virtually	  all	  of	  FN	  voters	  are	  against	  immigration.	  99%	  of	  all	  FN	  voters	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  too	  many	  foreigners	  in	  France,	  while	  94%	  believe	  that	  French	  values	  do	  not	  comply	  with	  Islam.	  Clearly,	  FN	  voters	  have	  a	  fundamental	  mistrust	  of	  immigrants,	  particularly	  of	  those	  from	  Islamic	  nations.	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  Figure	  5.2	  Taken	  from	  an	  ISPOS  survery  titled  ³)UDQFH/HVQRXYHOOHVIUDFWXUHV´&HUYLSRI&156
http://www.cevipof.com/fr/france-­2013-­les-­nouvelles-­fractures/resultats/;;  Published  in  Le  Monde  Janauary  24  2014  	  	        
Legislative	  Accomplishments  
	   Unlike	  the	  FPO	  or	  the	  DPP,	  Front	  National	  has	  not	  had	  the	  advantage	  of	  actually	  being	  in	  government	  to	  implement	  its	  ideas.	  However,	  while	  it	  has	  not	  been	  in	  government	  
ǡ	ǲǳand	  in	  exerting	  ǲǳthe	  issue	  of	  immigration.	  89	  FN	  has	  been	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  89	  Shields,	  James	  (2007).	  The	  extreme	  right	  in	  France:	  from	  Pétain	  to	  Le	  Pen.	  p.204	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the	  most	  forceful	  and	  effective	  in	  exploiting	  these	  issues	  and	  in	  dictating	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  they	  are	  addressed.	  Front	  National	  is	  a	  force	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  immigration,	  and	  its	  opponents	  are	  acutely	  aware	  of	  this	  fact.	  Prior	  to	  2012,	  Former	  French	  Prime	  Minister	  Nicolas	  Sarkozy	  on	  numerous	  occasions	  expressed	  his	  support	  for	  a	  proposed	  law	  that	  would	  have	  given	  foreign	  residents	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  local	  elections.	  However,	  he	  then	  completely	  changed	  his	  position	  on	  the	  issue	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  appease	  FN	  voters	  before	  the	  2012	  elections90.	  The	  fact	  that	  Sarkozy	  and	  his	  party	  shifted	  to	  the	  right	  on	  ǲreflected	  the	  policy	  influence	  that	  the	  FN	  was	  able	  to	  exert	  on	  the	  political	  agendaǳ91	  	  Front	  National	  may	  not	  be	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly	  directing	  policy,	  but	  its	  influence	  can	  easily	  be	  felt.	  	  FN	  is	  certainly	  a	  major	  political	  force	  in	  France,	  even	  if	  it	  may	  currently	  lack	  the	  official	  standing	  in	  government.	  	  
   	   	  
VIII.	  Comparative	  Analysis:	  Examining	  the	  Motivating	  Factors	  among	  the	  Right	  Wing	  
Electorate	  	   A	  large	  portion	  of	  the	  support	  for	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  is	  born	  out	  of	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment;	  there	  are	  no	  credible	  scholars	  who	  would	  refute	  this.	  The	  question	  then	  becomes	  what	  exactly	  is	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  this	  sentiment?	  Do	  RPP	  voters	  fear	  immigration	  because	  they	  want	  to	  look	  after	  their	  economic	  interests	  (economic	  
Ȍǲǳculture	  (cultural	  protectionism)?	  To	  answer	  this	  question,	  I	  will	  compare	  the	  two	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  ǲSarkozy	  shifts,	  Hollande	  digs	  in	  on	  foreign	  voting	  rightsǳFrance	  24.	  	  April	  26th	  2012	  91	  Ivaldi,	  GilǲThe  Successful  Welfare-­Chauvinist  Party?  The  Front  National  in  the  2012  
elections  in  France´SXEOLVKHGLQ³(XURSHDQ6RFLDORJLFDO$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V5HVHDUFK1HWZRUNRQ
3ROLWLFDO6RFLDORJ\&RQIHUHQFH0LODQR,WDO\´'HFHPEHUst  2012 
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hypotheses	  directly	  to	  see	  which	  is	  the	  greater	  motivating	  factor	  among	  RPP	  voters.	  I	  will	  
ǯich	  he	  used	  the	  2002/2003	  European	  Social	  Survey	  to	  compare	  motivating	  factors	  among	  RPP	  voters.	  Oesch	  concluded	  that	  cultural	  motivations	  were	  a	  much	  more	  significant	  predictor	  of	  RPP	  voting	  than	  economic	  motivations.	  I	  will	  perform	  a	  similar	  analysis	  of	  RPP	  voters	  using	  data	  from	  the	  2012	  European	  Social	  Survey	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Austria	  where	  2008	  was	  the	  most	  recent	  ESS	  available)	  to	  see	  if	  I	  will	  get	  similar	  results.	  	  	  	   	  In	  the	  European	  Social	  Survey,	  thousands	  European	  voters	  from	  dozens	  of	  different	  countries	  answered	  a	  series	  of	  hundreds	  of	  questions,	  and	  among	  them	  were	  a	  few	  questions	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  immigration.	  The	  survey	  participants	  were	  asked	  directly	  if	  they	  
ǲǳǲ
ǯs	  cultural	  heritageǳǤthe	  survey	  respondents	  to	  just	  those	  who	  self-­‐identify	  as	  members	  of	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party,	  then	  we	  could	  get	  a	  good	  sense	  	  if	  there	  is	  a	  correlation	  between	  holding	  certain	  beliefs	  and	  being	  a	  member	  of	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party.	  	   	   	  Figure	  6.1	  Created	  by	  author	  using	  data	  from	  the	  2012	  European	  Social	  Survey	  
	   The	  chart	  above	  measures	  the	  percent	  of	  RPP	  voters	  in	  participating	  European	  Social	  Survey	  compared	  to	  the	  number	  of	  RPP	  who	  voted	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  elections	  before	  the	  survey	  was	  taken.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  Front	  National,	  all	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  seem	  











Austria   FPÖ   1228   161   13.10%   17.5%(2008)  
Denmark   DPP   1328   116   8.73%   12.3%(2011)  
France   FN   804   37   4.60%   3.7%(2011)  
Switzerland   SVP   744   132   17.74%   26.6%(2011)  
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ǡǯǤThis	  is	  a	  common	  phenomenon	  among	  right	  wing	  voters.	  Oesch	  finds	  that	  right	  wing	  populist	  voters	  are	  consistently	  underrepresented	  in	  these	  kinds	  of	  surveys	  due	  to	  what	  can	  be	  described	  as	  ǲbehavior	  (people	  do	  not	  admit	  having	  voted	  for	  a	  party	  on	  tȌǳ92.	  Indeed,	  Oesch	  found	  similar	  disparities	  in	  his	  experiment,	  so	  while	  it	  would	  be	  ideal	  to	  have	  a	  perfectly	  accurate	  samples	  RPP	  voters,	  this	  is	  not	  something	  that	  is	  ever	  likely	  to	  happen.	  	  	   ǯǲǳs	  measured	  by	  the	  total	  number	  of	  its	  self-­‐indentified	  supporters	  who	  participated	  in	  the	  ESS	  before	  one	  controls	  for	  other	  
Ǥǡǯparticipants,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  13.1%	  chance	  that	  person	  will	  be	  an	  FPÖ	  supporter.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  experiment	  is	  to	  compare	  this	  base	  support	  with	  the	  level	  support	  a	  RPP	  receives	  once	  we	  control	  for	  other	  factors.	  In	  this	  case,	  these	  controls	  will	  be	  a	  whether	  a	  voter	  agrees	  or	  disagrees	  with	  ǣǲǳ
ǲǯǳǤ 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Oesch,	  p.	  354	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   Figure	  6.2	  Created	  by	  Author	  using	  data	  from	  the	  2012	  European	  Social	  Survey	  	   To	  measure	  base	  support,	  I	  counted	  how	  many	  of	  the	  total	  survey	  respondents	  self	  indentified	  as	  supporters	  of	  the	  FPÖ.	  To	  measure	  the	  support	  for	  economic	  protectionism,	  I	  then	  counted	  how	  many	  of	  the	  survey	  respondents	  agreed	  with	  the	  statement	  that	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taken	  as	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  theory	  that	  economic	  protectionism	  is	  a	  motivating	  factor	  among	  FPÖ	  voters.	  	  I	  then	  used	  this	  same	  method	  to	  measure	  the	  importance	  of	  cultural	  protectionism.	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  statemeǲǯǳǡI	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  Figure	  6.4	  Created	  by	  Author	  using	  Data	  from	  the	  ESS	  	  	   As	  one	  can	  observe,	  all	  of	  the	  other	  case	  studies	  follow	  similar	  distributions.	  In	  every	  case,	  the	  probability	  of	  randomly	  selecting	  an	  RPP	  voter	  ǲǳ
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protectionism	  and	  economic	  protectionism	  are	  predictive	  of	  RPP	  success,	  and	  that	  cultural	  is	  a	  much	  stronger	  predictor	  than	  economic	  protectionism.	  	  	  
IX.	  Comparative	  Analysis:	  Measuring	  the	  effect	  of	  Electoral	  Systems	  	  
	   We	  know	  that	  anti-­‐immigration	  positions	  make	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  attractive	  to	  a	  large	  number	  of	  voters,	  but	  popular	  support	  by	  itself	  will	  not	  necessarily	  guarantee	  electoral	  success.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  French	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  Front	  National	  has	  a	  large	  number	  of	  supporters,	  as	  evidenced	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  regularly	  receives	  more	  than	  10%	  of	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  elections.	  Despite	  this	  base	  support,	  FN	  currently	  only	  has	  one	  representative	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  This	  has	  led	  many	  to	  theorize	  that	  the	  two-­‐round	  election	  system	  is	  detrimental	  to	  RPPs,	  and	  that	  they	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  succeed	  in	  a	  proportional	  system.	  	  
	   To	  test	  this	  theory,	  I	  will	  compare	  RPPs	  representation	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament	  with	  its	  current	  vote	  share	  in	  national	  parliament.	  All	  European	  elections	  are	  decided	  by	  proportional	  representation,	  so	  a	  country	  like	  France	  will	  have	  a	  completely	  different	  electoral	  system	  when	  electing	  its	  leaders	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament	  compared	  to	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  Therefore,	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  France	  and	  the	  UK,	  we	  should	  be	  keen	  to	  notice	  any	  major	  difference	  in	  RPP	  representation	  between	  the	  European	  and	  the	  national	  parliaments.	  Any	  kind	  of	  disparity	  in	  representation	  between	  the	  two	  parliaments	  should	  give	  one	  a	  good	  idea	  sense	  of	  the	  difference	  a	  proportional	  electoral	  system	  makes	  for	  RPPS.	  	  ǯtheir	  respective	  nations	  are	  not	  members	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	  Data	  is	  represented	  graphically	  below:	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   It	  is	  possible	  tha	ǯ
	ǯpublic.	  	  Corina	  Stratulat theorizes	  that	  the	  European	  Parliamentary	  vote,	  much	  like	  the	  vote	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  French	  national	  elections,	  is	  a	  subject	  to	  protest	  voting,	  and	  therefore	  the	  popularity	  of	  RPPs	  is	  being	  exaggerated	  in	  EU	  elections93.	  	  Indeed,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  European	  parliament	  does	  not	  have	  as	  much	  of	  a	  direct	  effect	  ǯs	  as	  any	  national	  parliament,	  so	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  voters	  would	  not	  take	  these	  elections	  as	  seriously.	  However,	  if	  one	  observes	  Austria,	  Denmark,	  and	  Belgium,	  three	  countries	  with	  proportional	  systems,	  one	  notices	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  significant	  disparity	  in	  vote	  shares	  between	  national	  and	  European	  elections.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  FPÖ	  actually	  has	  a	  higher	  representation	  in	  its	  own	  national	  parliament	  than	  it	  does	  in	  the	  European	  parliament.	  Protest	  voting	  may	  very	  well	  occur	  in	  these	  elections,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  have	  such	  an	  impact	  as	  to	  make	  a	  ǯnoticeably	  and	  consistently	  greater	  than	  in	  its	  national	  parliament.	  If	  France	  were	  to	  change	  to	  a	  proportional	  system,	  one	  should	  expect	  Front	  National	  to	  receive	  a	  vote	  share	  
Ǥ	ǯvote	  share	  in	  the	  European	  elections,	  whatever	  it	  may	  be,	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  rough	  indicator	  
	ǯ	ch	  electorate,	  even	  if	  it	  will	  not	  necessarily	  be	  reflected	  in	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  StratuǡǲʹͲͳͶǡǡ
ǫǳǤEuropean	  Policy	  Centre	  September	  2013	  p.	  8	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X.	  Conclusions	  	  	   After	  reviewing	  the	  scholarly	  literature	  on	  the	  topic	  I	  brought	  forth	  three	  hypotheses	  to	  explain	  the	  rise	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  in	  Western	  Europe:	  
x Hypothesis	  #1:	  Cultural	  factors	  are	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  success	  of	  far	  right	  parties.	  	  
x Hypothesis	  #2:	  Economic	  factors	  are	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  success	  of	  far	  right	  parties.	  	  	  
x Hypothesis	  #3:	  Structural	  factors	  are	  most	  responsible	  for	  the	  success	  of	  far	  right	  parties.	  	  The	  evidence	  yielded	  from	  my	  three	  case	  studies	  as	  well	  as	  my	  own	  comparative	  analysis	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  cultural	  factors	  are	  the	  primary	  predictor	  of	  the	  success	  of	  right	  wing	  populism.	  	  When	  asked	  directly	  on	  the	  subject,	  right	  wing	  populist	  voters	  consistently	  revealed	  that	  they	  were	  more	  concerned	  about	  the	  cultural	  implications	  of	  immigration	  rather	  than	  the	  economic	  implications.	  ǡǯusing	  the	  2002	  European	  Social	  Survey	  yielded	  strong	  evidence	  that	  cultural	  protectionism	  was	  a	  more	  significant	  motivating	  factor	  among	  right	  wing	  voters	  than	  economic	  protectionismǤǯʹͲͳʹEuropean	  Social	  Survey,	  I	  found	  a	  similar	  pattern:	  right	  wing	  populist	  voters	  in	  every	  country	  were	  significantly	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  cultural	  implications	  of	  immigration,	  and	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  much	  more	  accurate	  predictor	  of	  right	  wing	  voting	  than	  economic	  factors.	  Therefore,	  we	  can	  affirm	  that	  there	  is	  significant	  evidence	  to	  support	  that	  H1	  is	  more	  relevant	  to	  the	  study	  of	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  than	  H2.	  	  	   This	  thesis	  affirms	  that	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  greatly	  benefit	  from	  culturally	  motivated	  anti-­‐immigration	  sentiment	  among	  the	  electorate,	  but	  only	  on	  the	  condition	  that	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they	  are	  running	  in	  countries	  that	  award	  parliamentary	  seats	  based	  on	  proportional	  representation.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  case	  stu	ǡ	ǯelectoral	  success	  is	  significantly	  hindered	  by	  two-­‐round	  elections.	  Front	  National	  has	  significant	  support	  among	  the	  general	  public,	  and	  this	  is	  reflected	  in	  opinion	  polls,	  its	  showing	  in	  the	  first	  round	  of	  national	  elections,	  and	  most	  notably	  in	  its	  representation	  in	  the	  European	  Parliament.	  However,	  this	  support,	  while	  substantial,	  is	  with	  a	  minority	  of	  voters.	  This	  would	  not	  be	  an	  issue	  under	  a	  proportional	  system,	  where	  Front	  National	  would	  be	  awarded	  seats	  based	  strictly	  on	  the	  number	  of	  votes	  it	  receives.	  	  However,	  under	  the	  French	  system,	  Front	  National	  has	  to	  win	  individual	  elections	  outright,	  a	  much	  more	  difficult	  task	  for	  a	  radical	  party.	  Without	  a	  proportional	  system,	  a	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  can	  still	  be	  a	  significant	  influence	  in	  the	  political	  process,	  but	  only	  in	  an	  unofficial	  capacity.	  Front	  National	  exerts	  its	  influence	  by	  dictating	  the	  tenor	  and	  focus	  of	  the	  immigration	  debate,	  but	  without	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  proportional	  system	  it	  cannot	  advocate	  for	  its	  desired	  reforms	  from	  within	  the	  National	  Assembly.	  Since	  one	  can	  reasonably	  conclude	  that	  Front	  National	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  a	  major	  party	  in	  a	  proportional	  system,	  one	  can	  affirm	  H3	  which	  states	  that	  RPPs	  owe	  their	  success	  in	  part	  to	  structural	  factors.	  	  	   	  For	  my	  secondary	  research	  question,	  I	  set	  out	  to	  determine	  exactly	  how	  successful	  each	  right	  wing	  populist	  party	  has	  been	  in	  implementing	  its	  agenda.	  Though	  they	  have	  not	  limited	  it	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  they	  would	  like,	  on	  a	  whole	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  been	  relatively	  successful	  in	  shaping	  both	  legislation	  and	  public	  opinion	  related	  to	  immigration.	  The	  FPO	  and	  the	  DF,	  with	  the	  help	  of	  coalition	  governments,	  have	  both	  been	  able	  to	  pass	  substantial	  restrictions	  on	  immigration.	  Right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  have	  been	  victorious	  not	  just	  in	  legislating	  change,	  but	  also	  in	  shifting	  sentiment	  and	  tenor	  towards	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the	  issue.	  The	  more	  moderate	  conservative	  parties	  in	  Austria	  and	  France	  have	  adopted	  more	  assertive	  anti-­‐immigration	  positions	  as	  a	  direct	  response	  to	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  more	  or	  less	  forcing	  the	  issue	  on	  them.	  	  Whether	  directly	  or	  not,	  nearly	  all	  immigration	  reforms	  over	  the	  past	  twenty	  years	  have	  been	  influenced	  by	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  in	  some	  way.	  	  	  	    
 	  	  	  
XI.	  Future	  Research	  Questions	  	  	   While	  this	  thesis	  was	  a	  comprehensive	  look	  at	  the	  rise	  of	  right	  wing	  populism,	  it	  was	  simply	  not	  feasible	  to	  address	  all	  of	  the	  possible	  variables.	  One	  potential	  explanatory	  factor	  not	  mentioned	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  competence	  of	  the	  respective	  party	  leaders.	  Indeed,	  independent	  of	  all	  other	  factors,	  most	  would	  suspect	  that	  some	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  are	  more	  successful	  than	  others	  in	  part	  because	  they	  are	  better	  run	  and	  better	  organized.	  I	  chose	  not	  address	  this	  in	  my	  thesis	  mainly	  because	  this	  aspect	  of	  electoral	  study	  does	  not	  lend	  itself	  well	  to	  quantitative	  analysis.	  Even	  if	  there	  is	  a	  widely	  held	  view	  that	  some	  party	  leaders	  are	  simply	  better	  than	  others	  at	  spreading	  their	  message	  and	  appealing	  to	  voters,	  this	  is	  still	  ultimately	  a	  highly	  subjective	  claim	  and	  not	  something	  that	  can	  be	  easily	  measured	  or	  analyzed.	  Still,	  this	  could	  potentially	  be	  a	  significant	  explanatory	  factor,	  and	  certainly	  one	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  examine	  in	  the	  future,	  even	  though	  I	  currently	  would	  not	  know	  how	  to	  go	  about	  doing	  so.	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   Another	  potential	  explanation	  that	  I	  would	  like	  to	  explore	  more	  can	  be	  described	  
ǲ	  ǳǤThis	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties,	  more	  so	  than	  others,	  are	  dependent	  on	  having	  a	  charismatic	  leader	  in	  order	  to	  become	  successful.	  	  Indeed,	  the	  FPO	  was	  not	  a	  major	  party	  until	  Haider	  took	  control,	  and	  after	  he	  left	  the	  party	  was	  again	  in	  crisis	  until	  it	  found	  another	  enigmatic	  leader	  in	  Strache.	  Moreover,	  Front	  National	  has	  seen	  its	  national	  standing	  increase	  dramatically	  in	  the	  short	  time	  that	  Marine	  La	  Pen	  has	  been	  the	  party	  leader,	  and	  many	  analysts	  attribute	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  this	  success	  to	  her	  personal	  appeal.	  Though	  I	  was	  not	  able	  to	  find	  credible	  studies	  suggesting	  that	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  were	  more	  dependent	  than	  others	  on	  having	  a	  strong	  leader,	  it	  is	  certainly	  an	  idea	  that	  warrants	  further	  research.	  	  	  	  	   As	  previously	  alluded	  to,	  this	  thesis	  was	  also	  limited	  by	  inopportune	  timing.	  The	  final	  draft	  of	  this	  paper	  was	  submitted	  in	  April	  of	  2014,	  about	  a	  month	  before	  the	  European	  Parliamentary	  Elections.	  Obviously	  it	  would	  have	  been	  preferable	  to	  have	  election	  data	  from	  2014	  as	  opposed	  to	  2009.	  Five	  years	  is	  not	  an	  insignificant	  amount	  of	  time,	  and	  the	  political	  landscape	  of	  a	  country	  can	  change	  dramatically	  between	  elections,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  with	  France.	  This	  data	  would	  have	  been	  especially	  relevant	  considering	  that	  all	  three	  of	  my	  case	  studies	  are	  currently	  leading	  in	  the	  polls.	  These	  poll	  numbers	  are	  certainly	  a	  useful	  tool	  in	  gauging	  the	  current	  level	  of	  right	  wing	  support,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  been	  preferable	  to	  have	  the	  official	  election	  results.	  I	  am	  interested	  to	  see	  to	  how	  right	  wing	  populist	  parties	  will	  fare	  this	  coming	  May,	  and	  if	  I	  am	  to	  present	  this	  research	  in	  the	  future	  I	  will	  certainly	  update	  my	  findings	  with	  election	  data	  from	  the	  2014	  European	  election.	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